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SPACE, TIME, AND HISTORICAL INJUSTICE:
A FEMINIST CONFLICT-OF-LAWS APPROACH
TO THE “COMFORT WOMEN” AGREEMENT
Karen Knop & Annelise Riles†
After more than twenty years of worldwide feminist activism, transnational litigation, and diplomatic stalemate, on December 28, 2015, Japan and South Korea announced a
historic agreement intended to provide closure to the so-called
“Comfort Women issue”—the issue of what Japan must do to
atone for the sexual enslavement of up to 200,000 women
from throughout Asia in service to the Japanese troops before
and during World War II. Reactions to this landmark agreement continue to be mixed, and the question for many is
whether it will hold. One challenge is how to respect the scale
and systematicity of the crimes without imposing a single narrative, or without projecting an overdetermined understanding
of the gendered past onto the future. We offer an analysis of
this question in a wider lens: how to address grave historical
injustices when legal claims and advocacy goals spread and
metamorphose not only over time, but also across
jurisdictions.
Focusing on one high profile and particularly contentious
provision of the agreement, concerning a privately erected
statue honoring the Comfort Women outside the Japanese embassy in Seoul, we first show that the usual questions about
settlements for historical injustices—whether they will achieve
closure and what kind—can productively be traded for attention to where and when closure and reopening occur.
Borrowing our analytical lens from conflict of laws, we
refine the problem as a manifestation of a pervasive issue for
feminist justice in a globalized world that we call “spatio† Karen Knop, Professor of Law, University of Toronto. Annelise Riles, Jack
G. Clarke Professor of Law in Far East Legal Studies and Professor of Anthropology, Cornell University. For comments and suggestions, we thank Roxana Banu,
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Women Problem at Cornell Law School; the Sociological Inquiries Into International Law Conference, London School of Economics; the University of Minnesota
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temporal diffusion.” We argue that a novel response to this
diffusion of historical injustices can be grounded in conflict-oflaws techniques. Using the hypothetical of a case brought by
Korean Comfort Women in California, we redescribe the field’s
techniques for dealing with time across space as a matter of
what we term the “sequencing” of different spatio-temporal
horizons. This approach resonates with, but also goes a step
beyond, the arguments of certain feminist social theorists that
feminist politics must be polytemporal. In the mode of an interdisciplinary experiment, we deploy the conflicts technique
of sequencing spatio-temporal horizons as a more specified
and hopeful approach to a feminist future.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 28, 2015, Japan and South Korea1 announced a historic agreement2 intended to provide closure to
the so-called “Comfort Women issue”3—the issue of what Japan must do to atone for the sexual enslavement of up to
200,000 women from throughout Asia in service to the Japanese troops before and during World War II.4 Women and girls
were captured, coerced, or deceived with promises of employment and sent to military brothels, including on the frontlines,
1
The Republic of Korea (ROK) is also known as South Korea. See Korea,
South, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ks.html [https://perma.cc/W522-HTKG] (last updated Jan. 12,
2017). In this Article, we will refer to it as “Korea” except when distinguishing
South from North Korea.
2
See Full Text of Announcement on ‘Comfort Women’ Issue by Japanese,
South Korean Foreign Ministers, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.japan
times.co.jp/news/2015/12/28/national/politics-diplomacy/full-text-announcement-comfort-women-issue-japanese-south-korean-foreign-ministers/ [https://
perma.cc/C6XD-CLS5] [hereinafter Agreement].
3
The Japanese term “Comfort Women” reflects the rationale that sex provided Japanese soldiers a form of comfort from the battlefield. The principal
reasons given for the establishment of the Comfort Women system, though, were
to prevent the troops from contracting sexually transmitted diseases and to
counteract the anti-Japanese sentiment caused by Japanese soldiers’ sexual
abuse of civilian women. See Prosecutors and the Peoples of the Asia-Pacific
Region v. Showa, No. PT-2000-1-T, Judgment on the Common Indictment and the
Application for Restitution and Reparation at 43 (Women’s Int’l War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery Corr. 2002) [hereinafter Judgment of the Tokyo Women’s Tribunal]; On the Issue of “Comfort Women,” MINISTRY
FOREIGN AFF. JAPAN (Aug. 4, 1993), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/issue9308.html [https://perma.cc/9PXU-Z3WH]. In this Article, we will use the
terms “Comfort Women” and the “Comfort Women issue” because this terminology is pervasive in the relevant debates. We do so recognizing that the euphemism of “Comfort Women” is problematic for its erasure of the violence at issue in
these cases and that many activists prefer the label of “sexual slavery.” In our
view, however, the reference to all of the victims as “slaves” also limits our appreciation of the full historical complexity of the relevant events, including the agency
of the women involved.
4
See generally USTINIA DOLGOPOL & SNEHAL PARANJAPE, COMFORT WOMEN: AN
UNFINISHED ORDEAL (1994); DAI SIL KIM-GIBSON, SILENCE BROKEN: KOREAN COMFORT
WOMEN (1999); MAKI KIMURA, UNFOLDING THE ‘COMFORT WOMEN’ DEBATES: MODERNITY,
VIOLENCE, WOMEN’S VOICES (2016); IN-HWAN PARK, CAN YOU HEAR US? THE UNTOLD
NARRATIVES OF COMFORT WOMEN (2014); CRISTINA LOPE YL. ROSELLO, DISCONNECT: THE
FILIPINO COMFORT WOMEN (2011); DAVID ANDREW SCHMIDT, IANFU— THE COMFORT
WOMEN OF THE JAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY OF THE PACIFIC WAR: BROKEN SILENCE (2000);
C. SARAH SOH, THE COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND POSTCOLONIAL MEMORY IN
KOREA AND JAPAN (2008); YUKI TANAKA, JAPAN’S COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL SLAVERY AND
PROSTITUTION DURING WORLD WAR II AND THE US OCCUPATION (2002); YOSHIMI YOSHIAKI,
COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL SLAVERY IN THE JAPANESE MILITARY DURING WORLD WAR II
(Suzanne O’Brien trans., Columbia Univ. Press 2000) (1995); COMFORT WOMEN
SPEAK: TESTIMONY BY SEX SLAVES OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY (Sangmie Choi Schellstede ed., 2000); LEGACIES OF THE COMFORT WOMEN OF WORLD WAR II (Margaret Stetz
& Bonnie B. C. Oh eds., 2001).
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to provide sexual services to Japanese soldiers where they were
held for months or years.5 The agreement includes an official
apology by Japan’s Prime Minister and a payment of ¥1 billion
(approximately U.S. $8.3 million) from the state budget to establish a foundation that will provide aid to the surviving victims.6 The two governments also agreed that “this issue is
resolved finally and irreversibly” and that they “will refrain from
accusing or criticizing each other regarding this issue in the
international community.”7
To most observers, the sheer fact of serious negotiations,
let alone a settlement, came as a considerable surprise.8 For
over twenty years, feminist activists in South Korea, elsewhere
in Asia, and around the world, the South Korean and other
governments, and a remarkable array of other international
actors have raised the issue of justice for the Comfort Women
with little result.9 The conclusion of a state-to-state agreement
specifically focused on harms to women represents a major
development in feminist international jurisprudence.
The most pressing question for many, however, is whether
the December 28 agreement will hold. Reactions continue to be
mixed. Some victims have accepted the agreement, while
others have decried the lack of consultation with them during
the negotiation process,10 pledged to ignore it,11 or even sued
5
See TANAKA, supra note 4, at 37–44; Judgment of the Tokyo Women’s Tribunal, supra note 3, at 74–81; YOSHIAKI, supra note 4, at 103–10.
6
Agreement, supra note 2, § 1(1)–(2); see also Japan Completes Transfer of
¥1 Billion to South Korean ‘Comfort Women’ Fund, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 1, 2016),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/01/national/politics-diplomacy/
japan-completes-transfer-¥1-billion-south-korean-comfort-women-fund/
[https://perma.cc/V66T-VHUA] (discussing payment specifics).
7
Agreement, supra note 2, §§ 1(3), 2(1), 2(3).
8
See Justin McCurry, Japan and South Korea Agree to Settle Wartime Sex
Slaves Row, GUARDIAN (Dec. 28, 2015, 7:19 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/dec/28/japan-to-say-sorry-to-south-korea-in-deal-to-end-disputeover-wartime-sex-slaves/ [https://perma.cc/D4R5-AGRV].
9
See infra subpart II.A.
10
See Lack of Consultation with Victims Means ‘Comfort Women’ Deal Should
Not Be Final: Support Group, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 31, 2015), http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/12/31/national/politics-diplomacy/groupsays-as-victims-were-not-consulted-comfort-women-deal-not-final/ [https://
perma.cc/H95N-C578].
11
See Former ‘Comfort Women’ Are Asked by South Korean Officials to Accept
Accord with Japan, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2015/12/29/national/korean-former-comfort-women-divided-agreementjapan/ [https://perma.cc/KNM6-VEZ9]. Two Korean Comfort Women who rejected the agreement travelled to Japan to obtain a face-to-face apology from the
Prime Minister and official compensation. See Justin McCurry, Former Sex Slaves
Reject Japan and South Korea’s ‘Comfort Women’ Accord, GUARDIAN (Jan. 26,
2016, 7:20 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/26/former-sex-
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the Korean government for making the deal when Japan still
refuses to acknowledge legal responsibility.12 The United
States, which played an active role in encouraging both sides to
resolve the issue in order to foster closer economic, diplomatic,
and military ties among its allies in Asia, has embraced the
agreement as “an important gesture of healing and reconciliation that should be welcomed by the international community.”13 In contrast, one Korean activist organization has
described the agreement as reflecting “diplomatic collusion
that betrays the victims and citizens.”14 In response to urgings
from the U.S. State Department to support the agreement,15
some Korean-American groups have suspended anti-Japanese
protests, while others have criticized the agreement as limited
and flawed.16 A Korean court has already defied the Korean
President’s negotiation of finality by opening a damages suit
against the Japanese government on behalf of ten Comfort Women.17 And following the inaugural board meeting of the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation set up under the
slaves-reject-japan-south-koreas-comfort-women-accord/ [https://perma.cc/
RF42-BHUW].
12
See South Korea Faces Lawsuit over Sex Slave Agreement as a Dozen
Survivors Rebel, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2016/08/30/national/crime-legal/south-korean-government-faces-lawsuit-comfort-women-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/5EYQ-K6WE].
13
Sam Kim & Maiko Takahashi, ‘Comfort Women’ Deal Likely to Fuel TokyoSeoul Military Cooperation, Aid Obama Pivot, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 29, 2015), http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/12/29/national/politics-diplomacy/key-offi
cial-tokyo-seoul-resolution-war-legacy-beef-looks-fuel-military-cooperation-aideobama-pivot/ [https://perma.cc/R2N2-U67D] (quoting Susan Rice, U.S. National
Security Advisor).
14
Park Hopes ‘Comfort Women’ Deal Helps Reset Tokyo Ties; Victims, Critics
Displeased, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/
2015/12/29/national/politics-diplomacy/park-hopes-comfort-women-dealhelps-reset-tokyo-ties-victims-critics-displeased/ [https://perma.cc/ADL3-JR
V9].
15
See Press Release, John Kerry, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Resolution of the Comfort Women Issue (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.state.gov/secre
tary/remarks/2015/12/250874.htm [https://perma.cc/X5RT-5V6V].
16
See Korean-American Group Suspends Activities Related to ‘Comfort Women,’ JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/12/
30/national/korean-american-group-suspends-activities-related-to-comfort-wo
men/ [https://perma.cc/HT68-DSJD]; KAFC Statement on the Japan-S.Korea
Deal, KOREAN AM. F. CAL. (Apr. 23, 2016), http://kaforumca.org/kafc-statementon-the-japan-s-korea-deal/ [https://perma.cc/J5DE-UMFY].
17
See Alastair Gale, Japan-South Korea ‘Comfort Women’ Deal Faces Backlash in Seoul, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 3, 2016, 12:29 AM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/comfort-women-deal-faces-backlash-in-seoul-1451557585 [https://
perma.cc/KF6R-TNN2]; Elizabeth Shim, Japan Could Face Lawsuit From Former
‘Comfort Women,’ UPI (Dec 31, 2015, 12:14 PM), http://www.upi.com/
Top_News/World-News/2015/12/31/Japan-could-face-lawsuit-from-formercomfort-women/2081451580990/ [https://perma.cc/8KG6-LDDW].
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agreement, a protester tear-gassed the Foundation’s chief.18
On December 28, 2016, the first anniversary of the agreement,
Korean activists put up a statue of a Comfort Woman outside
the Japanese consulate in Busan, Korea’s second-largest city,
leading Japan to recall its ambassador to Korea and suspend
various high-level economic talks between the two countries.19
Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has suggested that Korea is
now in violation of the spirit of the agreement.20 Meanwhile,
some Philippine Comfort Women are pressing their country’s
President to negotiate a similar agreement on their behalf.21
In a globalized world, no one settlement can possibly resolve the Comfort Women issue once and for all. Legal efforts
to address the issue prior to the December 28 agreement included conflict-of-laws and other cases brought in a number of
countries to obtain an apology and compensation, and the
agreement does not explicitly bar private suits against private
parties.22 Beyond its paramount significance for the women
18
See Violent Protests Mar Seoul Launch of ‘Comfort Women’ Fund, JAPAN
TIMES (July 29, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/29/na
tional/politics-diplomacy/¥1-billion-comfort-women-fund-launched-south-ko
rea-japan-not-yet-sent-cash/ [https://perma.cc/P6WS-V6FR] [hereinafter Violent Protests Mar Seoul Launch].
19
See Editorial, No Closure on the ‘Comfort Women,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/opinion/no-closure-on-the-comfortwomen.html [https://perma.cc/3EHV-NUTY].
20
See Abe Urges South Korea to Remove ‘Comfort Women’ Statue at Busan,
Claims 2015 Agreement at Stake, JAPAN TIMES (Jan. 8, 2017), http://www.japan
times.co.jp/news/2017/01/08/national/abe-urges-south-korea-remove-com
fort-women-statue-says-agreements-credibility-stake/ [https://perma.cc/HH86R322].
21
See McCurry, supra note 11. Japan has said that it has no plans to
conclude agreements with any other countries. Id.
22
See Agreement, supra note 2. On the one hand, comments on the December 28 settlement by the leader of Korea’s opposition party seem to assume that it
bars private suits: “Despite the treaty in 1965, (South Korea’s) Supreme Court
recognized that individuals’ right of claim has not dissipated and the Constitutional Court clarified the government’s duty to make an effort to protect the
individuals’ right of claim . . . . [T]he Park[ ] administration suddenly abolished
this policy, which buried numerous endeavors.” Rob York & Ha-young Choi,
Unresolved Issues Haunt Comfort Women Agreement, N. KOR. NEWS (Jan. 5, 2016),
https://www.nknews.org/2016/01/unresolved-issues-haunt-comfort-womenagreement/ [https://perma.cc/TZ8L-UJ8K]. On the other hand, a South Korean
legal academic notes that the agreement does not resolve the controversy between
Japan and Korea over whether the 1965 bilateral agreement on war reparations
extinguishes all claims. Id. Moreover, a case has been brought in Korea since the
settlement. See Shim, supra note 17.
In foreign courts, the treatment of the December 28 agreement might vary.
For example, a private lawsuit brought in the United States might be precluded as
raising a “political question” better left to the executive branch. In a 2005 Comfort
Women case, on which we base our hypothetical in Part III infra, the U.S. State
Department submitted a Statement of Interest to this effect regarding the World
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themselves, the dispute has assumed importance for the national identities of Japan and Korea,23 has merged with international feminist activism around the prosecution of sexual
violence in current conflicts as a profound injustice for women
everywhere,24 has led to tensions between Japanese and Korean diasporas abroad,25 and has even become enmeshed with
territorial disputes.26 Conversely, cross-border historical
wrongs come to have new domestic implications, as in a January 2017 ruling of a Korean court that the Korean government
maintained a “Comfort Women” system of its own for the U.S.
military in the 1960s and 70s, analogous to the Japanese Comfort Women system, and systematically violated the human
rights of the Korean women who worked as prostitutes there.27
What interests us in this Article is the “spatio-temporal
diffusion” of historical injustice, as we call this phenomenon.
Experiences of historical injustice are multiplied, accelerated,
slowed down, revived, and continually transformed by global
circulations of persons, resources, media, documentation, and
forms of legal argumentation. Even domestic issues of the past
are increasingly spreading, refracting, and combining across
space, and the truth and reconciliation processes and other
remedies developed for those domestic issues are contributing
War II peace treaties with Japan. Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48–52 (D.C. Cir.
2005). Unlike our hypothetical below, this case was brought under the Alien Tort
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2015), and was against Japan, as opposed to invoking
private law against a private party. Most recently, see You v. Japan, 150 F. Supp.
3d 1140, 1144–48 (N.D. Cal. 2015). It is also possible that a U.S. court might
interpret Japan’s official acceptance of wrongdoing in the December 28 agreement
as consistent with a subsequent case seeking an apology from an individual.
23
See SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 2–7; CHIZUKO UENO, NATIONALISM AND GENDER
73–79 (Beverley Yamamoto trans., 2004).
24
See Karen Knop, The Tokyo Women’s Tribunal and the Turn to Fiction, in
EVENTS: THE FORCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 145, 150–153, 156 (Fleur Johns, Richard
Joyce & Sundhya Pahuja eds., 2011).
25
See infra subpart I.B.
26
See Mikyoung Kim, Memorializing Comfort Women, 6 ASIAN POL. & POL’Y 83,
88–89 (describing a banner added to a Comfort Women memorial in Seoul by a
Japanese right-wing group asserting Japan’s sovereignty over islands disputed
with Korea) [hereinafter Kim, Memorializing Comfort Women]; Seoul to Propose
Mediation Over ‘Comfort Women’ Issue, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 28, 2012), http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/08/28/news/seoul-to-propose-mediationover-comfort-women-issue/ [https://perma.cc/C9RU-7A4V]; Adam Westlake,
Lawsuit Forces Japanese Government to Disclose 1965 Korean Treaty Documents,
JAPAN DAILY PRESS (Oct. 12, 2012), http://japandailypress.com/lawsuit-forcesjapanese-government-to-disclose-1965-korean-treaty-documents-1215741/
[https://perma.cc/5UZ8-WWTG].
27
See Choe Sang-Hun, South Korea Illegally Held Prostitutes Who Catered to
G.I.s Decades Ago, Court Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/01/20/world/asia/south-korea-court-comfort-wo
men.html [https://perma.cc/72MH-ZSRS].
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to expectations for international legal resolutions such as the
December 28 agreement.28 Wrongs of sexual violence are especially amplified because rape is often used as a deliberate tactic
against an enemy in war, an ethnic nation, or women in general.29 Spatio-temporal diffusion affects the way that time itself
is experienced, history is remembered, and the future is anticipated in different jurisdictions.
While a conflicts case would potentially be available as a
strategy for reopening the December 28 agreement, what inspires us more is the style of analysis that this field would bring
to the larger question of closure. Rather than the familiar
questions about settlements for historical injustices—whether
they will achieve closure and what kind30—conflicts as a style
of analysis argues for and sharpens attention to where and
when. The result is a different vision of the problem. Equally
important, a conflicts lens suggests a new way forward that
seeks to work with this spatio-temporal diffusion.
Conflict of laws, or private international law as it is known
outside the United States, is the part of the state’s law that
deals with cases involving a “foreign element,” meaning a connection to some legal system other than that of the jurisdiction
in which the case is being tried. Courts hearing such cases
must decide not only whether their own or some other jurisdiction’s substantive law applies, but which jurisdiction’s law determines whether the case is out of time.31 As any conflicts
28
See RUTI G. TEITEL, GLOBALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS
xiv–xv (2014) [hereinafter TEITEL, GLOBALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE].
29
See BRENDA FITZPATRICK, TACTICAL RAPE IN WAR AND CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
RECOGNITION AND RESPONSE 5–7 (2016).
30
See, e.g., Courtney Jung, Walls and Bridges: Competing Agendas in Transitional Justice, in FROM RECOGNITION TO RECONCILIATION: ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS 357, 358 (Patrick Macklem
& Douglas Sanderson eds., 2016) (observing that “governments may try to use
transitional justice to draw a line through history and legitimate present policy,
whereas Indigenous peoples may try to use the past to critique present policy and
conditions”). While our interest is in drawing attention to “where” and “when,” we
share Leora Bilsky’s view that the question of “what kind of settlement?” is an
important advance on “whether or not settlement.” See LEORA BILSKY, THE HOLOCAUST, CORPORATIONS AND THE LAW: UNFINISHED BUSINESS (forthcoming) (manuscript
at 250–52) (on file with authors).
31
See FRANÇOIS RIGAUX, LE CONFLIT MOBILE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 17
(1966) (noting that “la dimension temporelle des conflits de lois dans l’espace doit
y être jugée inhérente: elle correspond à la nécessité . . . d’assigner à toute règle de
droit son domaine de validité dans le temps” [“the temporal dimension of conflict
of laws in space must be understood as inherent: it corresponds to the necessity
of assigning to every legal rule a temporal scope of validity”]).
In this Article, we focus on the question of endpoints, but conflict of laws also
deals with other temporal issues. See, e.g., F.A. Mann, The Time Element in the
Conflict of Laws, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 217 (1954); J.H.C. Morris, The Time Factor
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lawyer knows, changing jurisdictions (so-called forum shopping) can be a strategy for opening or reopening a historical
wrong such as the Comfort Women issue. Our aim, however, is
not to present conflict of laws as a practitioner might, but to
redescribe its approach, its doctrines, and its debates in a way
that relates more broadly to the law’s treatment of space-time
and the longstanding feminist concern with fashioning a politics oriented toward the future. We contend that conflicts has
untapped resources for thinking about space and time together—ethnographically and theoretically, as well as legally.
This methodology builds on ethnographic work by one of
us on law as technique32 and on our work with Ralf Michaels in
which we demonstrate how critical problems in feminist theory
can, surprisingly, be reimagined by examining them through
the mundane technicalities of conflict of laws.33 We will argue
similarly that conflicts yields a unique and powerful way of
seeing, organizing, and approaching the Comfort Women issue
and other refracted issues of historical injustice. While the
failure after the war to prosecute or compensate the wrongs
suffered by the Comfort Women was deeply discriminatory, and
while the ongoing controversies are reflective of persistent stereotypes of women and the harmful uses of these stereotypes in
international law, we describe our conflict-of-laws approach as
“feminist” more because it engages problems of time, space,
and the future central to feminist social theory.34
The Article proceeds as follows. Focusing on a high-profile
and particularly contentious provision of the December 28
agreement concerning the status of a privately erected statue
honoring Comfort Women outside the Japanese embassy in
in the Conflict of Laws, 15 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 422 (1966). In addition, some
conflicts theorists have argued that conflicts holds lessons for thinking about
conflicts between past and present laws (for example, the issue of retroactivity in
criminal law). See CHRISTIAN GAVALDA, LES CONFLITS DANS LE TEMPS EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ (1955); FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS, AND THE LIMITS OF THEIR OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PLACE AND TIME 45 (William
Guthrie trans., 2d ed. 1880); John K. McNulty, Corporations and the Intertemporal
Conflict of Laws, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 12 (1967); Roger J. Traynor, Conflict of Laws in
Time: The Sweep of New Rules in Criminal Law, 4 DUKE L.J. 713 (1967).
32
ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011) [hereinafter RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE].
33
Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, From Multiculturalism to Technique: Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REV. 589
(2012) [hereinafter Knop, Michaels & Riles, From Multiculturalism].
34
See Nicola Lacey, Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights of Women, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 13, 13–30 (Karen Knop ed., 2004) (distinguishing varieties
of feminist legal theory, their substantive and methodological continuities with
other legal and social theories, and the ways in which abstract ideas not specifically about men or women can nevertheless reflect male perspectives).
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Seoul, Part I illustrates how trading the usual questions about
settlements—whether they will achieve closure and what
kind—for attention to where and when helps to envisage the
problem as a manifestation of spatio-temporal diffusion. Part II
discusses the history of efforts to obtain justice for the Comfort
Women, the key features of the December 28 agreement, the
cracks that are already emerging in the agreement, and the
debate about kinds of closure that it reflects and provokes.
Part III describes the derivation of the feminist conflict-of-laws
approach that we propose and uses the hypothetical of a lawsuit brought by Korean Comfort Women in California to introduce conflicts insights into the analysis of space-time.
Revisiting the problem of spatio-temporal diffusion as it
manifests in the Comfort Women issue, Part IV applies this
feminist conflict-of-laws approach to refine an understanding
of the condition and to draw out resonances with ideas of time,
space, and the future developed by certain feminist social theorists. In the mode of an interdisciplinary experiment, Part V
returns to our hypothetical lawsuit to identify the conflicts
technique of sequencing spatio-temporal horizons as a more
specified vision of a hopeful feminist future that these feminist
social theorists are searching for.
I
CONTROVERSY OVER A STATUE
Whether the December 28 agreement will resolve the Comfort Women issue hinges as much on controversies over the
appropriate kind of closure as on the substance of the remedy.
It is striking that although financial compensation for the Comfort Women, many of whom returned as outcasts to lives in
poverty,35 has for decades been central to activism on their
behalf, the relatively small size of the settlement fund specified
in the agreement has provoked much less attention in both
Korea and Japan than its treatment of a statue.36
The statue referenced in the December 28 agreement is a
bronze figure of a young Korean woman erected by non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul.37 Dressed in simple traditional clothes, the
35
See Pyong Gap Min, Korean “Comfort Women”: The Intersection of Colonial
Power, Gender, and Class, 17 GENDER & SOC’Y 938, 948 (2003).
36
See Agreement, supra note 2, § 2(2).
37
Historic South Korea-Japan Deal Stumbles over Comfort Women Statue,
STRAITS TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016, 9:57 AM), http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/eastasia/historic-south-korea-japan-deal-stumbles-over-comfort-woman-statue
[https://perma.cc/QP5Q-PYSX] [hereinafter Deal Stumbles].
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figure sits impassively facing the embassy. An empty chair
next to her represents the Comfort Women who have died since
the war, and the shadow of a frail elderly woman engraved on
the base “reflect[s] the agony that still haunts the survivors.”38
Over one thousand weekly demonstrations seeking justice for
the Comfort Women have been held at this location,39 and the
statue has, in turn, been subject to counter-reaction. Whereas
supporters regularly wrap the figure in clothing depending on
the season—a knitted hat and scarf in winter40—a Japanese
right-wing group in 2012 mounted a banner on the empty chair
asserting Japan’s sovereignty over a group of small islands
disputed with Korea.41
A. What Closure Is Possible?
News reports suggest that the removal of the statue was
central among Japan’s demands, and the agreement commits
Korea to address the issue:
The Government of the ROK acknowledges the fact that the
Government of Japan is concerned about the statue built in
front of the Embassy of Japan in Seoul from the viewpoint of
preventing any disturbance of the peace of the mission or
impairment of its dignity, and will strive to solve this issue in
an appropriate manner through taking measures such as
consulting with related organizations about possible ways of
addressing this issue.42

In Korea, NGOs responded with anger to the possibility
that the statue should be removed and pledged to erect replicas
of the statue throughout the country.43 A dispute persists between the two states over whether the agreement actually commits Korea to remove the Comfort Woman statue, with some in
the Japanese ruling party insisting that no funds ought to be
transferred until it is removed44 and the Korean government
stressing that it has no authority to remove a privately erected
statue.45
38

Id.
Kim, Memorializing Comfort Women, supra note 26, at 88.
40
Deal Stumbles, supra note 37.
41
See Kim, Memorializing Comfort Women, supra note 26, at 88–89.
42
Agreement, supra note 2, § 2(2).
43
See Park Calls on S. Korea to Support ‘Comfort Women’ Deal with Japan,
JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 31 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/12/31/
national/south-korean-group-pledges-to-erect-more-comfort-women-statues/
[https://perma.cc/FYF5-EF4W]. There are already over two-dozen similar monuments around South Korea. See Deal Stumbles, supra note 37.
44
Violent Protests Mar Seoul Launch, supra note 18.
45
Deal Stumbles, supra note 37.
39
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Why has the statue provoked such ire? Settlements for
historical wrongs increasingly provide for ways of keeping the
memory of the wrong alive,46 and the December 28 agreement
can be read in this vein. Its general tenor commits Japan to a
position of remorse, and the foundation established under the
agreement with Japan’s payment of ¥1 billion will not only
provide support for the former Comfort Women but also carry
out “projects for recovering the honor and dignity and healing
the psychological wounds of all former comfort women.”47 Respect for the memorial would seem to be entirely in keeping
with these terms. A good example is the British government’s
2013 settlement of the claims of Kenyan citizens who were
victims of violence during the Mau Mau insurgency of 1952–53
in the then-British colony.48 As part of the settlement, the
British government supported “the construction of a memorial
in Nairobi to the victims of torture and ill-treatment during the
colonial era” that would “stand alongside others that are already being established in Kenya as the country continues to
heal the wounds of the past.”49
A closer look, however, reveals that the Comfort Woman
statue commemorates not the suffering inflicted by the Comfort
46
See U.N. Human Rights Comm., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.13 (May 26, 2004) (stating that reparation can involve measures of satisfaction such as public apologies and public memorials); Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005) [hereinafter U.N. Basic Principles on
the Right to a Remedy]. The U.N. Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy
envisage access to justice, reparation, and access to relevant information as
among the components of victims’ right to a remedy. U.N. Basic Principles on the
Right to a Remedy, supra, ¶ 11. Reparation might consist of satisfaction, which,
in turn, might involve a “[p]ublic apology, including acknowledgement of the facts
and acceptance of responsibility[,]” “[c]ommemorations and tributes to the victims[,]” and “[i]nclusion of an accurate account of the violations that occurred . . .
in educational material at all levels.” Id. ¶ 22. On the U.N. Basic Principles on the
Right to a Remedy and their impact, despite their non-binding status in international law, see CHRISTINE EVANS, THE RIGHT TO REPARATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT 36–39 (2012).
47
Agreement, supra note 2, § 1(2); see also Japan Completes Transfer of ¥1
Billion to South Korean ‘Comfort Women’ Fund, supra note 6 (discussing payment
specifics).
48
See Foreign & Commonwealth Office & Right Honourable William Hague,
Foreign Secretary, Statement to Parliament on Settlement of Mau Mau Claims,
GOV.UK (June 6, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-toparliament-on-settlement-of-mau-mau-claims/ [https://perma.cc/GCR8-U4ER].
49
Id. The statue was unveiled in 2015. See Kenya Mau Mau Memorial
Funded by UK Unveiled, BBC (Sept. 12, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-34231890/ [https://perma.cc/7N24-CZUU].
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Women system during World War II per se, but rather “the
spirit and the deep history of the Wednesday Demonstration,”50 in the words of its inscription. It marks an open issue—an issue in need of present and future legal and political
attention. This visual marker is out of sync with the key term
of the agreement, from the Japanese point of view, that this
“issue is resolved finally and irreversibly.”51 Indeed, Japan’s
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has spoken of a desire to draw a line
under the past for the sake of future generations: “We must not
let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to
come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to
apologize.”52
In this respect, as we will discuss further in Part II, Japan
and Korea’s approach resembles the public international law
framework that prevailed after World War II, when Japan purported to settle all individual claims arising from the war by
lump-sum payment to their states.53 This approach presumes
that complete closure effectuated through states is both possible and desirable. Indeed, until the 1980s, very few World War
II memorials even alluded to innocent victims, as opposed to
fallen heroes.54 On this state-centered approach, moreover,
Japan is entirely within its rights to ask Korea to address the
issue of a statue outside its embassy in Seoul. Both states are
party to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which
places a “special duty” on the receiving state “to take all appropriate steps . . . to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the
50

Kim, Memorializing Comfort Women, supra note 26, at 88.
Agreement, supra note 2, at §§ 1(3), 2(1).
52
Statement by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan (Aug. 14, 2015), http://
japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html [https://
perma.cc/BDB6-EC8S]; see also Kazuhiko Togo, What’s Behind Abe’s New Position on ‘Comfort Women’?, E. ASIA F. (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.eastasiafo
rum.org/2016/01/03/whats-behind-abes-new-position-on-comfort-women/
[https://perma.cc/7WU4-J6B2] (describing possible motivations underlying
Prime Minister Abe’s willingness to address the Comfort Women issue). Cf. YUKIKO
KOGA, INHERITANCE OF LOSS: CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REDEMPTION
AFTER EMPIRE 198 (2016) (quoting the feeling of a Japanese lawyer representing
Chinese victims of chemical weapons abandoned by the Japanese army after
World War II that “[a]s the postwar generation, we inherit the burden of the past”
and must repay that debt).
53
Japan and Korea disagree on whether all claims were actually covered. See
Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2006Hun-Ma788, Aug. 30, 2011, (23-2(A)
KCCR, 366, 385–86) (S. Kor.), translated in http://search.ccourt.go.kr/ths/pr/
eng_pr0101_E1.do?seq=1&cname=%EC%98%81%EB%AC%B8%ED%8C%90
%EB%A1%80&eventNum=17450&eventNo=2006%ED%97%8C%EB%A7%88788
&pubFlag=0&cId=010400 [https://perma.cc/K29K-M9NA] [hereinafter Lee,
O-Soo v. Minister of Foreign Affairs].
54
See Samuel Moyn, You Must Remember This: Do Our Memorials to the Dead
Do More Harm Than Good?, NEW REPUBLIC, June 2016, at 80, 80.
51
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mission or impairment of its dignity.”55 The weekly demonstrations are arguably inconsistent with the functioning of diplomatic relations since their very purpose is to provoke and
embarrass the Japanese government. Even the statue alone,
according to one critic of the new agreement, “silently highlights the short-sightedness of this new deal by pointing up the
fact that both the Japanese and Korean government officials
apparently do not understand the depth of the pain experienced by those who were forced to be comfort women.”56
Whether the Vienna Convention would require the relocation of
the statue is an open question of interpretation, but it would
make inter-state diplomacy the terms of the argument rather
than the commemoration of victims.
In contrast, support for the statue tends to emanate from a
transitional justice framework, developed more recently in domestic societies dealing with regime change and now also invoked to address specific historical wrongs in stable regimes,
and from victim-oriented perspectives in contemporary international human rights law and international humanitarian
law.57 From this vantage point, rather than closing an issue,
resolution should keep it open to continual exploration by state
and non-state actors through such techniques as memorializing and collective justice partnerships between individuals,
groups, and states.
B. Not What Closure, but Where and When?
The conflict surrounding the Comfort Woman statue in Seoul has proliferated around the globe. The following artistic
and activist interventions across jurisdictions and the legal and
political controversies they have provoked illustrate the problem that we will develop through a conflict-of-laws lens: how
historical events have a spatio-temporal expansiveness.
55
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22(2), Apr. 18, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
56
D’Elia Chandler, Korean Comfort Women: Bargaining Chips in East-Asian
International Relations, RE: REFLECTIONS AND EXPLORATIONS (Jan. 28, 2016), https:/
/blogs.lt.vt.edu/reflectionsandexplorations/2016/01/28/korean-comfort-wo
men-bargaining-chips-in-east-asian-international-relations/ [https://perma.cc/
FY69-M6DA].
57
See TEITEL, GLOBALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 28, at xiv–xix (providing background on the contemporary transitional justice framework); see also
RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000) (articulating her original concept of
transitional justice) [hereinafter TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE]. We will use “transitional justice” loosely so as to encompass the spread of its orientation into stable
societies and into certain areas of international law.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-4\CRN401.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 15

22-MAY-17

SPACE, TIME, AND HISTORICAL INJUSTICE

15:44

867

• Glendale, California, 2013: In response to advocacy by
Korean-Americans, a local city council in California erects
a replica of the Seoul statue in a local public park in order
to commemorate the Comfort Women.58 Claiming that he
would use the park were it not for the statue, a JapaneseAmerican man files a lawsuit seeking its removal on the
grounds that the city council intruded on the federal government’s power to conduct foreign affairs.59
• Southfield, Michigan, 2014: A replica of the Comfort
Woman statue is put up outside a Korean American cultural center in a Detroit suburb after protests by a Japanese auto parts manufacturer in the area and by the
Japanese consulate prevent the statue from being placed
in a public library.60
• Fairfax, Virginia, 2014: Another copy, the seventh Comfort Women memorial in the United States, is installed
outside a Fairfax County government building with little
fanfare so as to avoid protests from Japan.61
• Burnaby, British Columbia, 2015: Plans for a Comfort
Woman statue in a Canadian suburb are scrapped after
objections that the statue would conflict with the country’s tradition of multiculturalism, although a professor of
community planning and gender studies laments the decision because of the scarcity of monuments to women who
suffered in wartime.62
• San Francisco, California, 2015: A proposal by the city’s
board of supervisors to install a Comfort Women memo58
See Jeyup S. Kwaak, California City Unveils ‘Comfort Women’ Statue, WALL
STREET J. (Aug. 2, 2013, 6:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2013/
08/02/california-city-unveils-comfort-women-statue/ [https://perma.cc/D4HBGKQF].
59
See Julian Ku, Japan and Korea Take Their (History) Wars to U.S. State and
Local Legislatures, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 24, 2014, 2:04 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/
2014/02/24/japan-korea-take-history-wars-u-s-state-local-legislatures/
[https://perma.cc/7858-6WZC]; Adam Poulisse, Glendale Comfort Women Statue
Controversy Goes to U.S. District Court, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 18, 2014, 6:14 PM),
http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20140418/glendale-comfort-womenstatue-controversy-goes-to-us-district-court [https://perma.cc/SSN3-JRLZ].
The case was dismissed on appeal. Gingery v. City of Glendale, 831 F.3d 1222
(9th Cir. 2016).
60
See Michigan Latest to Install Comfort Woman Statue, KOREA TIMES (Aug. 18,
2014), http://www.koreatimesus.com/michigan-gets-a-comfort-woman-statuealso/ [https://perma.cc/W3T3-S3RH].
61
See Ida Torres, ‘Comfort Women’ Monument to be Unveiled in Northern
Virginia, JAPAN DAILY PRESS (May 27, 2014), http://japandailypress.com/comfortwomen-monument-to-be-unveiled-in-northern-virginia-2748762/ [https://
perma.cc/CAC8-VSJD].
62
See Janaya Fuller-Evans, Comfort Women Statue Proposal Riles Group of
Japanese Canadians in Burnaby, BURNABY NOW (Mar. 19, 2015, 10:55 AM), http:/
/www.burnabynow.com/news/comfort-women-statue-proposal-riles-group-ofjapanese-canadians-in-burnaby-1.1798189/ [https://perma.cc/7ZE3-SC34].
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rial, the first in a major U.S. destination, prompts a harsh
letter of condemnation from Osaka’s ultra-right wing
mayor,63 as well as criticism from the Japanese-American
community in San Francisco, while a Korean Comfort
Woman flies in to give testimony at the board meeting.64
The supervisor who proposed the resolution states that it
is “not about Japanese people or the Japanese-American
community at all” but rather “a way for San Francisco . . .
to engage young people to understand what happened but
also to be vigilant about stopping human trafficking for
the future.”65
• Seoul, Korea, 2015: Days before the arrival of the Japanese Prime Minister, two life-size bronze statues are unveiled in a park, described by the New York Times as “[a]n
unsmiling South Korean girl star[ing] forward with an accusatory expression” and in a chair beside her “a Chinese
girl, her fists clenched on her lap into balls of defiance.”66
Apparently the first to depict a Chinese Comfort Woman,
the monument was organized by a Chinese-American
filmmaker inspired by the Glendale statue, a Chinese
sculptor, and South Korean civic groups and artists. As in
the case of the other statues, their creators describe them
as “peace monuments.”67 South Korean organizers of the
new monument in Seoul plan to invite sculptors from
other Asian countries where the women were recruited to
build replicas there.68
• Ashfield, New South Wales, Australia, 2016: A local Korean group commissions a replica of the Seoul statue and
Reverend Bill Crews, a minister with no particular relationship to the dispute, offers his church’s grounds as its
63
See Toyohiro Horikoshi, San Francisco Japanese-Americans Ask Why City
Needs a ‘Comfort Women’ Memorial, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 3, 2015), http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/11/03/national/politics-diplomacy/sanfrancisco-japanese-americans-ask-city-needs-comfort-women-memorial/
[https://perma.cc/VL2W-E7M8].
64
See Joshua Sabatini, Supervisors’ Support of a ‘Comfort Women’ Memorial
in San Francisco Sparks Debate, S.F. EXAMINER (Sept. 15, 2015, 1:00 AM), http://
www.sfexaminer.com/supervisors-support-of-a-comfort-women-memorial-insan-francisco-sparks-debate/ [https://perma.cc/2CW4-27RK].
65
Id.
66
Choe Sang-Hun, Statues Placed in South Korea Honor ‘Comfort Women’
Enslaved for Japan’s Troops, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/world/asia/south-korea-statues-honor-wartime-comfort-women-japan.html [https://perma.cc/84C2-8RQ3].
67
Id. But see Kim, Memorializing Comfort Women, supra note 26, at 90 (contrasting “peace” in the title of the Seoul statue with the reference to “human
rights” in the inscription on a New Jersey Comfort Women monument and attributing the difference to tactical appeals to Japan’s postwar pacifist identity and the
U.S. self-image as a human rights standard-bearer respectively).
68
Sang-Hun, supra note 66.
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home.69 He comes under pressure, however, from the
Japanese consul-general and New South Wales’s minister
of multiculturalism. A Japanese community network
threatens legal action on grounds that the statue is a
“hurtful historical symbol” that is “racially discriminatory”
and promotes hatred against Japanese.70 Mr. Crews himself is puzzled by the response because he interprets the
statue as standing for a general message: “It’s more than
just one country abusing women. It’s about the way men
abuse women and the way women get treated in war as
well.”71
• Freiburg, Germany, 2016: A Comfort Woman statue accepted by Freiburg from its South Korean sister city was to
have been the first erected in Europe.72 A Freiburg official
said that the statue would express opposition to violence
against women. The plan was dropped, however, after
strong opposition from Freiburg’s Japanese sister city.73
• Taipei, Taiwan, 2016: Activists calling for an apology and
compensation for Taiwanese Comfort Women stage a protest outside the office of a Japan-Taiwan liaison organization in which a performer sprayed bronze poses as a
Comfort Woman statue.74

Thus, beyond the control of states and civil society alike,
the statue’s replication again and again diffuses the issue of
wartime sexual slavery into ever more spatio-temporal contexts: from Japanese-Korean relations, to diaspora politics, to
U.S. foreign affairs, to Canadian and Australian multiculturalism, to women victims of war, human trafficking, peace, racial
discrimination, and violence against women. Replicas of the
Seoul statue proliferate, change, and even remanifest as people
replicating replicas. There is, here, a sense of what we will call
69
See Lisa Visentin, WWII Peace Statue in Canterbury-Bankstown Divides
Community Groups, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.smh.
com.au/nsw/wwii-peace-statue-in-canterburybankstown-divides-communitygroups-20160801-gqi99s.html [https://perma.cc/TMW4-3CZV].
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
See Europe’s First ‘Comfort Women’ Statue Planned for German City, JAPAN
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/08/na
tional/plan-afoot-install-europes-first-comfort-women-statue-freiburg/ [https://
perma.cc/WM8T-UKXZ].
73
See German City Drops Plan to Install First ‘Comfort Women’ Statue in
Europe, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/
09/22/national/german-city-drops-plan-install-first-comfort-women-statue-eu
rope/ [https://perma.cc/VM5C-3Q4E].
74
See Taiwanese Group Calls for Japan’s Apology to Former ‘Comfort Women,’
MAINICHI (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160816/
p2a/00m/0na/002000c/ [https://perma.cc/7N8D-F4PA].
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“Comfort Women Trouble”75—an experience of interminability
and exhaustion and a reversion to simplistic narratives on all
sides accompanied by lingering self-doubts and internal conflicts within all camps. At the same time, this “trouble” also
involves violence to, even the retraumatization of, those involved in the process of seeking healing and justice.
In our view, much of Comfort Women Trouble may be, in
effect, a symptom of the issue’s diffusion. Accordingly, we will
argue in this Article for redirecting feminist attention. The
problem of what closure is possible for issues of historical gender injustice must be understood in light of the spatial and
temporal diffusion of these issues. The question is not what
closure, but when and where are reopening and closure effectuated? The potentialities of this kind of diffusion are, we venture, a crucial question for feminist jurisprudence at this
juncture.76
We see Comfort Women Trouble as emblematic of a wider
ethical and aesthetic condition of feminist concern. For many
people, traumatic events from the past are continually diffusing geographically and resurfacing temporally, in bursts,
after lulls, in different locations, in different forms of expression, with different protagonists and different audiences. Who
might have a claim on the resulting trauma—as authors, as
victims, as engaged audiences—becomes difficult to sort out in
such scenarios. So, too, does the chameleon-like quality of the
harm in question, as it takes on new meanings, and as it moves
across boundaries of time and space and into the hands of
communities with different experiences and concerns. Is a
Comfort Woman statue a memorial to a particular political
movement in Seoul, or a statement about gender violence in
war writ large? Are the relevant victims the surviving Comfort
Women of a particular country, all Comfort Women, women in
general, humanity which suffers in war, victims of human trafficking, or indeed members of the Japanese diaspora? Is the
75
The analogy here is with “gender trouble.” See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER
TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY xxix–xxxvi, 195, 199, 202 (Routledge Classics 2006) (arguing that “‘effects’ of gender hierarchy and compulsory
heterosexuality are . . . misdescribed as foundations” and demonstrating, rather,
that “there need not be a ‘doer behind the deed,’ but that the ‘doer’ is variably
constructed in and through the deed” and there can therefore be “subversive
repetition within signifying practices of gender”—that is, “trouble”). We are grateful to Janet Halley for this formulation.
76
Cf. WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 13–18 (2009); WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 50–54 (2000) (maintaining that the implications of globalization should be a
crucial question for legal theory).
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relevant moment of the harm World War II, or the present, or a
future moment yet to come?
Crucial to the shift in direction that we propose is an appreciation that time is relationally produced rather than a
given external constraint. The feminist historian Victoria
Browne, for example, borrows from anthropology to emphasize
the practice of “sharing time” even across historical periods.77
Redescribed as an analytical lens, conflict of laws will add an
appreciation that it is not only time, but space-times that are
relationally constituted. The relations and even the actors
themselves are, in turn, effects of those colliding space-times.
From the outset, efforts to raise the Comfort Women issue have
entailed its geographic diffusion into other conflicts and jurisdictions. It was only in the 1990s that Korean Comfort Women
began to make their stories public and to demand an apology
and compensation from the Japanese government.78 The existence of Comfort Women was not unknown before then, but the
wrongs done to them were rarely regarded as criminal.79 In the
1990s, the recognition that rape was being deployed as an
instrument of ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia and Rwanda led
to a global feminist movement to end impunity for sexual violence in armed conflict, which influenced the 1998 treaty creating a permanent international criminal court.80 The Comfort
Women’s public demands were contemporaneous with and became part of this movement.81 We will return to the diagnosis
of spatio-temporal diffusion and Comfort Women Trouble in
77
VICTORIA BROWNE, FEMINISM, TIME, AND NONLINEAR HISTORY 39 (2014) (citing
anthropologist Johannes Fabian).
78
See GEORGE HICKS, THE COMFORT WOMEN: JAPAN’S BRUTAL REGIME OF ENFORCED PROSTITUTION IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 196–219 (1995).
79
See id. at 67–71, 180, 194–96; Maki Kimura, Narrative as a Site of Subject
Construction: The ‘Comfort Women’ Debate, 9 FEMINIST THEORY 5, 13–15 (2008);
KIMURA, supra note 4, at 4–11.
80
See generally Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the
Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive International Criminal Law, 30
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2008); Valerie Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery and the International
Criminal Court: Advancing International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605 (2004).
81
See Knop, supra note 24, at 150–51; see also Comm’n on Human Rights,
Subcomm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Systemic
Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, app. (June 22, 1998); U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights,
Report on the Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of
Korea and Japan on the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery in Wartime, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1996/53/Add.1 (Jan. 4, 1996); but see C. Sarah Soh, Japan’s National/
Asian Women’s Fund for “Comfort Women,” 76 PAC. AFF. 209, 214–15 (2003)
(tracing the 1990s transnational Comfort Women movement also to a 1970s
South Korean women’s campaign against international sex tourism).
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Part IV, after situating the December 28 agreement in more
detail and introducing our feminist conflict-of-laws lens.
II
CLOSURE AND THE COMFORT WOMEN AGREEMENT
A. After World War II: Prosecution and Compensation
By the time of the December 28 agreement between Japan
and South Korea, the issue of justice for the Comfort Women
had long been effectively foreclosed in both criminal and civil
law. After World War II, the Allied Powers established the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (or the “Tokyo Tribunal”)—the Tokyo counterpart of the better-known Nuremberg
tribunal—to prosecute high-ranking Japanese officials for war
crimes.82 Although the Chinese and Dutch prosecution teams
at the Tokyo Tribunal did offer some evidence of the Japanese
military’s Comfort Women system,83 the judgment contains
only two passing mentions of it,84 and crimes against Korean
Comfort Women were not prosecuted.85 In subsidiary war
crimes prosecutions in the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch
held at least two trials for crimes against Dutch Comfort Women.86 However, the Dutch trial records were later sealed,
which meant that no legal or historical record was established
by those trials.87 Thus, insofar as the Comfort Women issue
was criminally prosecuted in the aftermath of World War II, it
was virtually invisible and, in any event, did not address the
harms to Korean Comfort Women.88
Victims’ claims for compensation, as distinct from war
crimes prosecutions, were governed by the San Francisco
82

See NEIL BOISTER & ROBERT CRYER, THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUA REAPPRAISAL (2008).
83
See YUMA TOTANI, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN THE
WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 13–14, 153, 174, 176–79, 253 (2008). Prior to Totani’s
study, the understanding was that the Comfort Women issue “appear[ed] to have
been ignored, perhaps deliberately” at Tokyo. See, e.g., BOISTER & CRYER, supra
note 82, at 64.
84
DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: CHARTER, INDICTMENT AND JUDGMENTS 540, 1348 (Neil Boister & Robert Cryer eds., 2008).
85
See TOTANI, supra note 83, at 13–14.
86
See Trial of Washio Awochi (1946), in 8 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 122, 122–25 (U.N. War Crimes Comm’n ed., 1949); YOSHIAKI, supra note
4, at 163–73.
87
See STEPHANIE WOLFE, THE POLITICS OF REPARATIONS AND APOLOGIES 245
(2014).
88
Cf. Nicola Henry, Memory of an Injustice: The “Comfort Women” and the
Legacy of the Tokyo Trial, 37 ASIAN STUD. REV. 362, 372–75 (2013) (arguing that
silence can constitute a collective memory and that this was one such silence).
NAL:
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peace treaty with Japan.89 The peace treaty recognized Japan’s obligation in principle to pay reparations to the states
that it had invaded and left the exact amount of reparations for
later bilateral agreements to determine. The 1965 bilateral
agreement that restored diplomatic ties between Japan and
South Korea resulted in more than $845 million in economic
loans, grants-in-aid, and property claims. The bilateral agreement explicitly provides that it settles all claims between the
two states and their peoples completely and finally.90
The postwar reparation agreements with Japan exhibit the
features of traditional inter-state settlements in that lump-sum
payments went to the state to apportion to the victims as it
wished and individual claims were excluded.91 The compensation was more a reflection of the early twentieth-century norm
that belligerent states that violate the international regulations
on war must compensate the affected states than it was an
expression of apology or remorse toward specific victims for
specific wartime atrocities, as was the case with West Germany.92 The monies paid by Japan were not associated with
any particular past military crime. Indeed, the lump-sum settlement amount was never imagined to be an accurate accounting for the totality of individual losses.93 It was actually
89
Treaty of Peace with Japan, chs. V, VII, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136
U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter San Francisco Peace Treaty]; see Rainer Hofmann, Compensation for Personal Damages Suffered During World War II, in 2 MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 508, ¶ 9 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2013).
90
Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims
and on Economic Co-operation Between Japan and the Republic of Korea, arts.
1(1), 2(1), June 22, 1965, 583 U.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter 1965 Agreement]; San
Francisco Peace Treaty, supra note 89, at art. 4(a); Scott A. Snyder, South Korea,
Japan, and Wartime Shadows, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Aug. 11, 2015), http://
www.cfr.org/south-korea/south-korea-japan-wartime-shadows/p36889 [https:/
/perma.cc/QQZ9-99NF].
91
See Hofmann, supra note 89, ¶ 9; INT’L LAW ASS’N COMM. ON COMP. FOR
VICTIMS OF WAR, COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF WAR: BACKGROUND REPORT 13 (2004)
[hereinafter INT’L L. ASS’N BACKGROUND REPORT]. The work of the International Law
Association (“ILA”) Committee on Compensation for Victims of War, later known
as the Committee on Reparations for Victims of Armed Conflict, led to the adoption of two ILA resolutions. Int’l L. Ass’n Res. 1/2014, Reparation for Victims of
Armed Conflict (2014); Int’l L. Ass’n Res. 2/2010, Reparation for Victims of Armed
Conflict (2010). Contemporary conflicts may now give rise to mass-claims mechanisms. See INT’L L. ASS’N BACKGROUND REPORT, supra, at 16–19.
92
See WOLFE, supra note 87, at 245; Hofmann, supra note 89, ¶ 5–9. In some
Japanese cases, including cases brought by Comfort Women, it has been unsuccessfully argued that the international law of the time did support claims by
individuals. See Hofmann, supra note 89, ¶ 26.
93
See San Francisco Peace Treaty, supra note 89, at art. 14(a) (“It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and
suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the
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intended to protect Japan against the specter of such an accounting because given Japan’s poverty after the war, the
United States would have had to cover any shortfall.94 The
1965 bilateral agreement between Japan and Korea was oriented more toward the economic future of trade within the
region95 than toward atonement for the past, since compensation took the form of grants, loans, products, and services used
by the Korean government for the industrial development of the
nation. While the 1965 agreement does not acknowledge the
Comfort Women in any way, Japan’s view is that this treaty’s
explicit provision about finality forecloses all claims.96
Likewise, Japan’s position on individual suits brought in
Japan and the United States has been that the peace treaty
and related bilateral agreements terminate all claims.97 In the
United States most recently, a California court in late 2015
rendered two decisions in a putative class action for personal
injury and crimes against humanity brought by Korean Comfort Women against Japan and Japanese corporations and
their U.S. subsidiaries under the Alien Tort Statute, Torture
resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the
same time meet its other obligations.”).
94
See SAYURI UMEDA, THE LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, JAPAN: WWII POW AND
FORCED LABOR COMPENSATION CASES 19–20 (2008), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/
pow-compensation/japan.php [https://perma.cc/KP8Y-VDND].
95
See 1965 Agreement, supra note 90, pmbl. (referring to the parties’ desire
“to promote economic co-operation between the two countries”).
96
See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Sixth Periodic Report of States Parties:
Japan, ¶ 129, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/JPN/6 (Apr. 26, 2012),.
97
For a list of the law suits, see WOLFE, supra note 87, at 254–55. On these
suits, see Maki Arakawa, A New Forum for Comfort Women: Fighting Japan in
United States Federal Court, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 174 (2001); Masahiko
Asada & Trevor Ryan, Post-War Reparations Between Japan and China and Individual Claims: The Supreme Court Judgments in the Nishimatsu Construction Case
and the Second Chinese “Comfort Women” Case, 14 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR JAPANISCHES
RECHT / J. JAPANESE L. 257 (2009); Shin Hae Bong, Compensation for Victims of
Wartime Atrocities: Recent Developments in Japan’s Case Law, 3 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 187, 194–95, 200–01 (2005); Micaela Frulli, When Are States Liable Towards Individuals for Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law? The Markovic
Case, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 406, 419–20 (2003); John Haberstroh, In Re World War
II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation and Obstacles to International Human
Rights Claims in U.S. Courts, 10 ASIAN L.J. 253 (2003); INT’L L. ASS’N BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 91, at 25–26; KOGA, supra note 52, at 196–219; Yukiko Koga,
Accounting for Silence: Inheritance, Debt, and the Moral Economy of Legal Redress
in China and Japan, 40 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 494 (2013) [hereinafter Koga, Accounting
for Silence]; Yukiko Koga, Between the Law: The Unmaking of Empire and Law’s
Imperial Amnesia, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 402 (2016) [hereinafter Koga, Between the
Law]; Christopher P. Meade, Note, From Shanghai to Globocourt: An Analysis of
the “Comfort Women’s” Defeat in Hwang v. Japan, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 211
(2002); Byoungwook Park, Comment, Comfort Women During WWII: Are U.S.
Courts a Final Resort for Justice?, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 403 (2002).
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Victim Protection Act, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act. In one decision, the court accepted the argument that the treaties rendered the suit nonjusticiable under
the political question doctrine,98 although the argument did
not arise in the companion suit for defamation.99 In contrast,
the Supreme Court of Korea in 2012 recognized an individual’s
right to claim compensation from a Japanese corporation for
wartime forced labor, remanding a case against Mitsubishi.100
In lawsuits against the Japanese government both inside and
outside Japan, sovereign immunity is also an important
obstacle.101
Peace treaties can be ambiguous endpoints, however: are
they settlements in the past or do they establish relationships
that continue into the present? In a successful constitutional
case brought by Korean Comfort Women plaintiffs to compel
their government to reopen the 1965 agreement with Japan on
postwar compensation, the plaintiffs overcame the statute of
limitations by marshaling a constitutional-law argument about
a continuing treaty relationship and the continuing effect on
their present-day dignity.102 Similarly, in the case of historical
98
99

You v. Japan, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1144–48 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
You v. Japan, No. C 15-03257, 2015 WL 7454031 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24,

2015).
100
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Da22549, May 24, 2012 (2 S. CT. L.J. 233,
233–34, 250) (S. Kor.). For a snapshot of the successful cases against Japanese
corporations that followed, see Koga, Between the Law, supra note 97, at 430
n.45.
101
See Hofmann, supra note 89, ¶¶ 27–28; Koga, Between the Law, supra
note 97, at 421–23; UMEDA, supra note 94, at 5–8. As our interest in this Article is
in a conflict-of-laws approach to the legal construction of space-time, we will
focus on domestic statutes of limitations as an obstacle to civil actions against
private parties in some jurisdictions and will not canvas such treaty and sovereign
immunity arguments. We touch on the treaty argument in note 22, supra, and on
the implications of a long-shot limitations argument in note 295, infra. We also
note that other causes of action were possible. A lower court in Japan found
unconstitutional the legislature’s failure to enact a reparations law after a reasonable length of time. This judgment, however, was overruled. The “Comfort Women” Case: Judgment of April 27, 1998, Shimonoseki Branch, Yamaguchi
Prefectural Court, Japan, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 63, 94–102 (Taihei Okada trans.,
1999) [hereinafter The “Comfort Women” Case]. See also Bong, supra note 97, at
194–95.
102
Lee, O-Soo v. Minister of Foreign Affairs, supra note 53. But see Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (S.C., Apr. 28, 2010) (Phil.) http://
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm [https://
perma.cc/C83Z-UFXP] (holding that the Supreme Court of the Philippines could
not question the Philippine government’s diplomatic position that all postwar
claims against Japan had been settled by its peace treaty with Japan). A motion
for reconsideration was denied in 2014. Philippine Top Court Ends ‘Comfort Women’ Group’s Legal Battle, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/08/13/national/crime-legal/philippine-top-
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wrongs that predate a state’s obligations under an international human rights treaty, a scheme for redress may nevertheless violate the treaty by discriminating between groups of
victims.103
B. The Agreement
The December 28 agreement is not the first effort by Japan
to address the Comfort Women issue. Earlier Japanese initiatives had been rejected by many victims, women’s groups, and
governments as insufficient to bring about closure. These include a 1993 statement of apology by Japanese Chief Cabinet
Secretary Yohei Kono104 and the 1995 establishment of an
Asian Women’s Fund coordinated by the Japanese government
using private funds to provide financial compensation to victims, collect historical documentation, and support projects
relating to current women’s issues, such as violence against
women.105
Compared to these earlier efforts, two features of the December 28 agreement stand out. First, the fact that the apology contained in the agreement is addressed to the Comfort
Women by Prime Minister Abe “[a]s Prime Minister of Japan”106
responds to criticisms that earlier apologies by members of the
Japanese Cabinet were merely personal expressions of remorse.107 Second, unlike the Asian Women’s Fund, the funds
courts-denial-ends-filipino-comfort-women-groups-legal-battle/#.WJ1XOfK8osI
[https://perma.cc/C5PR-HLGA].
103
Patrick Macklem thus analyzes the right to equality in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a “memorial site” in law that “possess[es]
the potential to rearrange the present to restore what we remember—through
these sites—as fragments of the past.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Patrick Macklem,
Rybná 9, Praha 1: Restitution and Memory in International Human Rights Law, 16
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 15 (2005).
104
Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the Result of the
Study of the Issue of “Comfort Women,” MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. JAPAN (Aug. 4, 1993),
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html [https://perma.cc/
U66S-2TBV] [hereinafter Kono Statement].
105
See Closing of the Asian Women’s Fund, ASIAN WOMEN’S FUND, http://
www.awf.or.jp/e3/dissolution.html [https://perma.cc/Q2Z6-QPHF]; Soh, supra
note 81.
106
Agreement, supra note 2, § 1(1).
107
See Yuki Tatsumi, Japan, South Korea Reach Agreement on ‘Comfort Women,’ DIPLOMAT (Dec. 28, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/japan-southkorea-reach-agreement-on-comfort-women/ [https://perma.cc/Y5GN-2VBL].
For the previous statements, see Kono Statement, supra note 104; Statement by
Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on the Occasion of the Establishment of the
“Asian Women’s Fund,” MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. JAPAN (July 1995), http://
www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9507.html [https://perma.cc/ZAJ9UCK7].
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for the new foundation come from the budget of the government of Japan.108 Equally significant, the two states decided
that the Korean government would be the one to establish the
foundation. This arrangement represents an important diplomatic innovation in that it allows Japan to apologize and compensate the victims while maintaining its position that it has
no legal liability to individuals under international law.109 The
designation of the funds “for the purpose of providing support
for the former comfort women”110 and the mandate that the two
states cooperate on “projects for recovering the honor and dignity and healing the psychological wounds of all former comfort
women”111 also go a step beyond the traditional international
law framework. Yet they do not go so far as to overturn the
doctrine of diplomatic protection, under which the authority to
determine and apportion compensation rests with states.112
Activists in both Japan and Korea have raised concerns that
the agreement assigns only moral and not legal responsibility
to the Japanese government.113 The Korean Council for Women Forced Into Sexual Slavery, which represents some of the
victims, has objected that the agreement does not make clear
enough that the recruitment of women into the Comfort Women system “was a crime done by the Japanese government
and military systematically[,]”114 and has insisted that Japan
compensate the victims directly.115
In other ways, the December 28 agreement also combines
international law’s traditional state-centered approach to individual claims with more recent transitional justice-inspired approaches. The Japanese government’s “one-time contribution”
108

Agreement, supra note 2, § 1(2).
See Tatsumi, supra note 107.
110
Agreement, supra note 2, § 1(2).
111
Id.
112
See Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, art. 19 and commentary, in
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 61st
Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/61/10, at 94–100 (2006) (formulating recommended practices that give the individual greater weight, but recognizing that
these practices have not yet become customary international law).
113
See Japan-South Korea Deal on ‘Comfort Women’ Draws Mixed Reaction,
JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/12/29/
national/politics-diplomacy/japan-south-korea-deal-comfort-women-drawsmixed-reaction/ [https://perma.cc/9TWT-PHJE].
114
Kwanwoo Jun & Alexander Martin, Japan, South Korea Agree to Aid for
‘Comfort Women,’ WALL STREET J. (Dec. 28, 2015, 1:45 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/japan-south-korea-reach-comfort-women-agreement-1451286347
[https://perma.cc/5RGN-QYVD].
115
See id.; NCRR Statement on Comfort Woman ‘Settlement,’ NCRR, http://
www.ncrr-la.org/news/comfortwomen/comfortwomesettlement_ncrr.html
[https://perma.cc/XFE5-PKB8].
109
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to the establishment of the new foundation resembles the sort
of lump-sum bookkeeping found in earlier treaties. It seeks to
draw a line under the past so that relations between states can
move ahead on common concerns unencumbered by old debts
and liabilities. For example, Korea has linked the resolution of
the Comfort Women issue to bilateral issues such as military
intelligence sharing with Japan116 and a currency swap
pact,117 and the United States regarded the issue as impeding
the twelve-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement
reached in October 2015.118 At the same time, the December
28 agreement reflects the fact that expectations about the appropriate kind of closure have changed: transitional justiceinspired approaches anticipate a process of reconciliation that
involves but exceeds the state and is not limited to the law.119
Techniques range from compensating individuals, including for
mental harm and moral damage, to public apologies and tributes to the victims.120 It is true that apologies are already
recognized in international law as a form of satisfaction between states for an internationally wrongful act where restitu-

116

See Gale, supra note 17.
See Munenori Inoue, Japan, ROK Agree to Currency Swap Talks, JAPAN
NEWS (Aug. 28, 2016, 8:48 PM), http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/
0003179130 [https://perma.cc/27V9-TQ69]; see also Hyunah Yang, Revisiting
the Issue of Korean “Military Comfort Women”: The Question of Truth and Positionality, 5 POSITIONS 51, 56 (1997) (contrasting the Korean government’s assertion
that history must be differentiated from pressing current issues with its leveraging of the past in dealing with Japan on present-day economic problems).
118
See Jun & Martin, supra note 114. The United States has since withdrawn
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. See Ylan Q. Mui, Withdrawal from TransPacific Partnership Shifts U.S. Role in World Economy, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/withdrawal-from-transpacific-partnership-shifts-us-role-in-world-economy/2017/01/23/05720df6e1a6-11e6-a453-19ec4b3d09ba_story.html [https://perma.cc/PB42-V9A6].
119
There is also a growing international human rights and humanitarian law
literature on reparations that focuses on the status of an emerging right of the
victim to reparation, as opposed to her state; and on truth commissions and
reparations as complementary, rather than alternatives to one another. See, e.g.,
EVANS, supra note 46, at 1–10.
Anthropologist Yukiko Koga argues that in compensation lawsuits in China
and Japan brought by Comfort Women and wartime forced laborers, the accounting of bookkeeping is revealed as intertwined with the accounting of giving voice
and assigning responsibility, both at the macro-level between the two states and
their corporations and at the micro-level of the parties and their lawyers. Koga,
Accounting for Silence, supra note 97, at 495–96. Koga analyzes both as forms of
economy based on gift relations in which moral and monetary debts circulate and
feed into one another. Id. at 503.
120
See U.N. Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy, supra note 46, at pt.
IX.
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tion or compensation is insufficient.121 Nonetheless, the
nature of the apology and its addressees in the agreement seem
more in keeping with apologies to groups for historical wrongs
in the contemporary sense:
The issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the
Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women,
and the Government of Japan is painfully aware of responsibilities from this perspective.
As Prime Minister of Japan, Prime Minister Abe expresses anew his most sincere apologies and remorse to all
the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological
wounds as comfort women.122

Another transitional justice element might be the agreement’s anticipation of “projects for recovering the honor and
dignity and healing the psychological wounds of all former
comfort women,”123 which seems to reflect an understanding
that Japan cannot simply transfer funds whereupon the two
states will move on.
By the same token, however, Japan and Korea’s attempt to
resolve the Comfort Women issue “finally and irreversibly” has
attracted criticism. “An apology should open up space for accountability rather than close it,” commented the president of
the International Center for Transitional Justice: “[A]pologies
should not end truth seeking nor stifle truth telling by vic-

121
See Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
art. 37, in Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 52–53 (2001) (including
that satisfaction may not take a form “humiliating” to the responsible state).
122
Agreement, supra note 2, § 1(1); see also Richard B. Bilder, The Role of
Apology in International Law and Diplomacy, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 433, 461–69 (2006)
(comparing the traditional international law remedy of a state-to-state apology to
contemporary governments’ apologies to victims for past wrongs).
123
Agreement, supra note 2, § 1(2). How the funds would be used was a
significant hurdle for Japan. See Ayako Mie, Tokyo, Seoul Agree Part of ‘Comfort
Women’ Funds to Be Spent on Medical, Nursing Care, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/12/national/politics-diplomacy/
tokyo-seoul-agree-part-comfort-women-funds-spent-medical-nursing-care/
[https://perma.cc/H2PP-SVY4]. “A total of 245 women, living and deceased, and
their relatives are eligible to receive the money . . . . Around ¥2 million will be
disbursed to each family of any comfort woman who had died by the end of last
year, while those still alive will get about ¥10 million each.” Japan Completes
Transfer of ¥1 Billion to South Korean ‘Comfort Women’ Fund, supra note 6. As of
the time of transfer, Japan assumed that the money would go to medical and
nursing expenses, funeral costs, and scholarships for relatives. See id.
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tims.”124 Similarly, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women voiced regret that the agreement “did not fully adopt a victim-centred approach.”125 The
agreement also did not budge the U.N. Human Rights Committee from its earlier recommendations that, given the time bar
before its courts, Japan should take legislative and administrative measures to ensure that all allegations of wartime sexual
slavery or other human rights violations perpetrated by the
Japanese military against the Comfort Women are investigated,
prosecuted, and punished, that the victims and their families
receive full reparations, that all available evidence is disclosed,
that attempts to defame victims or deny the events are condemned, and that students are educated through references in
textbooks.126
C. Cracks in the Agreement
Prime Minister Abe initially took the position that no Japanese funds would be paid into the settlement fund until the
Comfort Woman statue outside Japan’s embassy in Seoul was
removed.127 In August 2016, however, Japan transferred the
full amount, despite opposition from elements within Abe’s ruling party, leaving Abe at a later summit to ask Korean Presi124
David Tolbert, Japan’s Apology to South Korea Shows What Public Apologies Should (Not) Do, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 29, 2016, 10:59 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/david-tolbert/japans-apology-to-south-k_b_9111566.html
[https://perma.cc/W9J8-2NZ6]; see also RUBEN CARRANZA ET AL., INT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, MORE THAN WORDS: APOLOGIES AS A FORM OF REPARATION 19
(2015) (discussing how apologies can motivate accountability, reparation, and
truth seeking).
125
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding
Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports of Japan,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/JPN/CO/7-8, at 8 (Mar. 7, 2016).
126
See Letter from the Special Rapporteur for Follow-up to Concluding Observations, Human Rights Comm., to His Excellency M. Junichi Ihara (Apr. 19,
2016), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/
JPN/INT_CCPR_FUL_JPN_23627_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF6G-PRJC] (referencing Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic
Report of Japan, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/JPN/CO/6, ¶ 14 (Aug. 20, 2014) and Human
Rights Comm., Additional Information on the Issue of Comfort Women to the
Comments by the Government of Japan on the Recommendations made in Paragraph 14 of the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee (CCPR/
C/JPN/CO/6) (n.d.), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/
Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2fCCPR%2fFCO%2fJPN%2f23340&Lang=EN
[https://perma.cc/X2NX-KFTJ]).
127
See ‘Comfort Women’ Funds Won’t Be Paid Until Sex Slave Statue Outside
Japanese Embassy Removed: Source, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 31, 2015), http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/12/31/national/politics-diplomacy/comfortwomen-funds-wont-be-paid-until-sex-slave-statue-by-japanese-embassy-re
moved-source/ [https://perma.cc/NWP2-TDXF].
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dent Geun-hye Park again to remove the statue.128 Korea
reportedly takes the position that the statue is not included in
the agreement,129 although another account of the summit interprets Park’s response that “steady implementation of the
agreement is important” as an acknowledgement of Abe’s
request.130
Other signs are emerging that this internationally negotiated closure to the Comfort Women issue may not hold.131
Foreign ministry talks are expected to be held to clarify the
meaning of the funds used to establish the reconciliation and
healing fund anticipated by the agreement.132 Japan seeks
confirmation that the transfer of funds does not constitute reparations, whereas Korea recognizes that the agreement’s opponents who support the Comfort Women want Japan to take
legal responsibility. Similar uncertainty surrounds the two
states’ commitment to avoid “accusing or criticizing each other
regarding this issue in the international community.”133 The
Korean government’s view is that a white paper being prepared
by Korea’s Gender Equality and Family Ministry on the Comfort Women issue is “unrelated” to the December 28 agreement,
but the Japanese government disagrees and has stated that it
expects the Korean government to react to the white paper in
light of its commitment not to raise the Comfort Women issue
internationally.134

128
See Kang Seung-woo, Comfort Woman Statue Remains Sticking Point in
Park-Abe Talks, KOREA TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016, 5:53 PM), http://
www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/09/116_213749.html [https://
perma.cc/4928-MS8V].
129
See id.
130
Abe, Park Agree to Coordinate Response on North Korea Missile Launches,
JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/07/
national/abe-asks-park-to-address-issue-of-seoul-comfort-woman-statue/
[https://perma.cc/U8PH-SAWC].
131
Another question is whether the December 28 agreement is binding in
international law, given that it consists simply of parallel statements by Japan’s
and Korea’s foreign ministers. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 2(1)(a) (Parties include Japan and Korea); see, e.g., Chandler, supra note 56 (assuming that the agreement is not legally binding).
132
See Tokyo Seeks Semantic Clarity on ‘Comfort Women’ Cash, JAPAN TIMES
(July 31, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/31/national/
politics-diplomacy/tokyo-seeks-semantic-clarity-comfort-women-cash/ [https://
perma.cc/E6E4-YC3J].
133
Agreement, supra note 2, §§ 1(3), 2(3).
134
Tokyo Alarmed by Seoul’s Plan to Press Ahead with ‘Comfort Women’ White
Paper, JAPAN TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/01/
06/national/politics-diplomacy/tokyo-keep-close-tabs-seoul-ministrys-plannedcomfort-women-white-paper/ [https://perma.cc/L8CS-KL8B].
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D. Feminism and the Future
It is easy to dismiss the two governments’ desire for a clean
pivot from past to future. Yet there might be other reasons to
support such a move. “[T]he deep worry,” as historian Samuel
Moyn recently put it, is that “‘the memory industry’ has . . .
taken up the cultural space our more willingly forgetful ancestors made for forging a common future.”135 In postwar Asia in
particular, the future and how to construct a future are particularly salient themes. The anthropology and cultural historiography of both Japan and Korea return again and again to
questions of how futures are imagined, created, and valued.136
Indeed, the argument for closure may find unexpected support from current debates within legal feminism. In recent
years, some feminists have taken issue with the very feminist
achievements of the 1990s in international criminal law that
made visible the wrongs suffered by the Comfort Women a half
century earlier.137 One concern is that the identification of
sexual violence as the gendered dimension of the most serious
crimes against a group, such as genocide, reinforces the idea
that rape leaves women forever victimized and thus perpetuates stigma against them.138 It thereby helps to obscure the
possibility of other subjective experiences of wartime sexual
violence and other kinds of gendered harms that may be felt as
violence.139 Another criticism of international criminal law approaches is that the association of sexual violence against wo135

Moyn, supra note 54, at 83.
See, e.g., MARILYN IVY, DISCOURSES OF THE VANISHING: MODERNITY, PHANTASM,
JAPAN (1995); HIROKAZU MIYAZAKI, ARBITRAGING JAPAN: DREAMS OF CAPITALISM AT THE
END OF FINANCE (2013); LISA YONEYAMA, HIROSHIMA TRACES: TIME, SPACE, AND THE
DIALECTICS OF MEMORY (1999).
137
See CHISECHE SALOME MIBENGE, SEX AND INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: THE ERASURE OF GENDER FROM THE WAR NARRATIVE (2013) (providing an account of the gains
made and challenges remaining); Nicola Henry, The Fixation on Wartime Rape:
Feminist Critique and International Criminal Law, 23 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 93, 94
(2014) (describing “the so-called feminist ‘success’ story . . . that sought to clearly
delineate wartime rape as a crime of grave magnitude that warranted explicit
treatment as a crime that offended humanity” and examining “postmodern feminist debates that question the desirability of fixating on sexual violence against
women in post-conflict justice initiatives”).
138
Janet Halley, Rape in Berlin: Reconsidering the Criminalisation of Rape in
the International Law of Armed Conflict, 9 MELB. J. INT’L L. 78, 113–14 (2008);
Vasuki Nesiah, Discussion Lines on Gender and Transitional Justice: An Introductory Essay Reflecting on the ICTJ Bellagio Workshop on Gender and Transitional
Justice, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 799, 805–06 (2006).
139
See Fionnuala Nı́ Aoláin, Political Violence and Gender During Times of
Transition, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 829, 838–39 (2006); Halley, supra note 138,
at 112–13; Neha Jain, Forced Marriage as a Crime Against Humanity: Problems of
Definition and Prosecution, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1013, 1021(2008).
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men with the violation of their state or the eradication of their
group in the legal construction of war crimes and the crime of
genocide reinforces the nationalist patriarchal story of the
raped woman as “culturally contaminated.”140 Problems are
also associated with the use of international criminal trials as a
way to establish history.141 The development of the international criminal trial’s history-telling function leads to the framing of women as never-ending victims because their victimhood
becomes inscribed in the nation’s history.142 The danger for
the Comfort Women, Hyunah Yang cautions, is that their identity will “freeze . . . as international victims, ‘existential’ comfort
women.”143
These critiques of the status of women as victims can be
understood as raising concerns about the dominant style of
closure. The concern is that international criminal prosecutions project the individual woman’s experience (framed as the
victim’s experience) into the future in less than empowering
140
See, e.g., ELISSA HELMS, INNOCENCE AND VICTIMHOOD: GENDER, NATION, AND
WOMEN’S ACTIVISM IN POSTWAR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (2013); Pascale R. Bos, Feminists Interpreting the Politics of Wartime Rape: Berlin, 1945; Yugoslavia,
1992–1993, 31 SIGNS 995, 1016–19, 1021–22 (2006); Karen Engle, Feminism and
Its (Dis)Contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 99 AM.
J. INT’L L. 778, 784 (2005). For other difficulties raised by international criminal
tribunals’ consideration of rape “only within the tightly scripted dominant narratives of . . . rapes as extensions of nationalism,” see Doris E. Buss, The Curious
Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, 25
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 3, 22 (2007).
141
See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL (1963); LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST (2001); ED MORGAN, THE AESTHETICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 2 (2007); MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE
LAW (1997); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1st ed. 1964); GERRY SIMPSON, LAW, WAR
AND CRIME: WAR CRIMES, TRIALS AND THE REINVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007);
TEITEL, GLOBALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 28; TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 57; RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, WRITING HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS (2011); Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1 (2002); Saira Mohamed, Deviance, Aspiration, and the Stories We Tell: Reconciling Mass Atrocity and the Criminal Law, 124 YALE L.J. 1628
(2015).
142
See Katherine M. Franke, Gendered Subjects of Transitional Justice, 15
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 813, 823–25 (2006); Ratna Kapur, Normalizing Violence:
Transitional Justice and the Gujarat Riots, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 885, 914–17
(2006). The roles of women as reproducers and symbols of the nation are well
studied in the feminist literature on nationalism. See, e.g., NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS,
GENDER AND NATION (1997). While very different from international criminal trials,
truth and reconciliation commissions have been criticized for imposing an unjust
narrative burden on women as rape victims, given that the silence of the rapists
can remain undisturbed. See, e.g., Kimberly Theidon, Gender in Transition: Common Sense, Women, and War, 6 J. HUM. RTS. 453 (2007) (discussing the Peruvian
Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
143
Yang, supra note 117, at 66.
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ways. For example, her victimhood is assumed to degrade her
entire experience of her biological lifetime, or her victimhood
comes to stand for national shame vis-à-vis aggressor nations.144 Indeed, in pushing for criminal prosecutions, international feminists also become troublingly allied with ethnic
nationalists in the legal characterization of rape as a genocidal
or military strategy in particular conflicts,145 and with political
chivalrists (“women and children first”).146 Katherine Franke
points to the dilemma in the context of transitional justice
initiatives: in order to bring closure, feminists seek to foreground sexual violence against women by acknowledging the
trauma so that healing can occur. But in doing so, they may
also be immortalizing the violence by projecting it onto the
nation’s history:
Often women’s stories, women’s memories, and women’s experiences are appropriated in the service of this rebuilding
project . . . . [T]heir sexual violation can come to stand for the
violation of the nation as a whole. So too, the fact that the
nation’s men were unable to protect “their” women from the
violence of the recent past can be rendered as a metaphor for
the emasculinization of the culture more broadly . . . .
....
In different ways, and by different means, rebuilding post
conflict societies is almost inevitably a process of remasculinization . . . .
While these concerns should be attended to with respect
to all of the mechanisms of transitional justice, they have
particular purchase in the context of criminal
prosecutions . . . .147
144
See Franke, supra note 142, at 822–23. Regarding the Comfort Women,
see Yang, supra note 117, at 62–65 (applying feminist analyses of rape developed
in the context of ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia, but differentiating based on Korea’s
identity as a colony of Japan). While the projection of the individual’s victimhood
onto the nation is particularly striking in the prosecution of wartime sexual violence, in part because it is exploited as a military tactic, it may also occur in other
cases. See, e.g., KOGA, supra note 52, at 197–99 (describing a lawsuit brought in
Japan by Chinese plaintiffs exposed to mustard gas from chemical weapons abandoned by the Japanese army at the end of World War II).
145
See Halley, Rape in Berlin, supra note 138, at 115. An example is feminists’
acceptance that children born of rape do not belong to the mother’s ethnic group.
See HELMS, supra note 140, at 58, 67–71; Engle, supra note 140, at 807–10.
146
See Engle, supra note 140, at 780.
147
Franke, supra note 142, at 823–25. Cf. Lauren Berlant, The Subject of True
Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 105, 108–09
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (questioning whether giving pride of
place to pain as a progressive strategy will work at cross purposes with future
possibilities for structural change in society); Vanessa Pupavac, International
Therapeutic Peace and Justice in Bosnia, 13 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 377, 396 (2004)
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The legal literature on gender and reparations within the
field of post-conflict justice148 is therefore attentive to its relationship to wider societal transformation and, to some degree,
to questions of women’s empowerment through forward-looking initiatives such as the redistribution of resources.149 With
these dilemmas among legal feminists in mind, then, we turn
from their question of whether closure is possible to the question of where and when opening or closure can occur.
III
A FEMINIST CONFLICT-OF-LAWS APPROACH
Our engagement with conflict of laws in this Article builds
on work in conflict of laws, feminist theory, and legal anthropology. A growing body of conflicts scholarship explores the
potential of the field as an approach to problems conventionally
treated as problems of public law, whether domestic or international.150 As distinct from earlier efforts, beginning with the
(pointing to “inherent contradictions in a radical therapeutic agenda of social and
cultural transformation in the absence of material advancement”).
148
See, e.g., FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN ET AL., ON THE FRONTLINES: GENDER, WAR, AND
THE POST-CONFLICT PROCESS (2011).
149
See, e.g., THE GENDER OF REPARATIONS: UNSETTLING SEXUAL HIERARCHIES WHILE
REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (Ruth Rubio-Marı́n ed., 2009); see also Ruth
Rubio-Marı́n, The Gender of Reparations in Transitional Societies, in id., at 63, 66
(exploring “ways to optimize the (admittedly modest) transformative potential of
reparations programs so that they serve . . . the ideal of a society altogether free of
gender subordination”); Andrea Durbach & Louise Chappell, Leaving Behind the
Age of Impunity: Victims of Gender Violence and the Promise of Reparations, 16
INT’L FEM. J. POL. 543, 545 (2014) (examining what features would be essential to
“a ‘transformative’ reparations framework capable of addressing the structural
causes of sexual violence”).
Truth and reconciliation commissions (“TRCs”) are also often contrasted with
international criminal trials in that they aim to enable victims to tell their stories
in their own way without attempting to develop a single historical narrative or set
of factual findings. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 14 NEGOT. J. 319,
326–33, 338–39 (1998). TRCs loosen or uncouple victim testimony and compensation from the objective proof of facts and determination of culpability central to
litigation. Truth telling is often conceived of as healing in and of itself. See id. at
329–33; LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE: SETTLING ACCOUNTS WITH
TORTURERS 245–46 (1990) (quoting Chile’s truth commissioner, José Zalaquett).
150
See, e.g., PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF
LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012); ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERING OF PRIVATE LAW (2009); PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE (Horatia Muir Watt & Diego P. Fernández Arroyo eds., 2014); GUNTHER
TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION
(Gareth Norbury trans., 2012); Jacco Bomhoff, The Constitution of the Conflict of
Laws, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra, at 262;
Hisashi Harata, An Interim Report on Savigny’s Methodology and His Founding of
a Modern Historical Jurisprudence, 8 U. TOKYO L. REV. 125 (2013); Christian
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work of Philip Jessup in the 1950s to combine conflict of laws
with these other fields into a single body of transnational
law,151 the interest of a number of current conflicts scholars is
in generalizing a distinctive conflicts approach to global governance.152 Our previous conflicts writings, separately and together with Ralf Michaels, contribute to this new
transdisciplinary direction,153 as does the present Article.
Our conflict-of-laws scholarship, in turn, draws on ethnographic work that one of us has conducted among lawyers in
the global financial markets, for whom conflicts is a key tool of
the trade.154 In that work, Riles describes the formidable
power of private legal form to reverse, redirect, and reorder the
temporality of politics through a series of aesthetic devices.
She refers to these as “legal techniques,” by which she means
“the skill and the art, the aesthetics and the bricolage, the
satisfaction of rehearsing and perhaps innovating upon or adding to a set of moves and postures one has observed, apprenticed, debated with other initiates.”155
Riles’s interest in legal technique is informed by feminist
anthropologist Marilyn Strathern’s work, in a very different
context, on the aesthetics of knowledge. Strathern describes
the power of the “constraint of form”: the appreciation that in
ritual and other contexts, aesthetic limitations in one dimenJoerges et al., A New Type of Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form in the Postnational Constellation, 2 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 153 (2011) (introducing a special issue on this topic); Theodora Kostakopoulou, Citizenship Goes Public: The
Institutional Design of Anational Citizenship, 17 J. POL. PHIL. 275 (2009); Robert
Wai, The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107
(2008); Dai Yokomizo, Conflict of Laws in the Era of Globalization, 57 JAPANESE
Y.B. INT’L LAW 179 (2014); Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Interpersonal
Human Rights and Transnational Private Law (Oct. 27, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2860275
[https://perma.cc/BNS5-BJA7].
151
PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2, 106 (1956). For background on
transnational law, see Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, Evolving, in ELGAR
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 898 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2d ed. 2012).
152
See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 150; MILLS, supra note 150; PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 150; TEUBNER, supra note 150;
Joerges et al., supra note 150; Wai, supra note 150.
153
Ralf Michaels, Post-Critical Private International Law: From Politics to Technique, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 150, at 54;
Karen Knop, Citizenship, Public and Private, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 309
(2008); Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, Foreword, 71 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (2008); Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, International Law in
Domestic Courts: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 103 PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 269
(2009); Annelise Riles, Cultural Conflicts, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273 (2008).
154
See RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 32.
155
Id. at 70, 72.
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sion author or engender powerful effects in others.156 Whereas
legal realists criticize legal form as a kind of sham and a mere
obfuscation of politics, Strathern’s insight led Riles to question
such critiques.157 In particular, Riles is interested in the temporal uses of private law technique—that is, as a device for
managing the future.158
The present Article builds particularly on our earlier article
co-authored with Ralf Michaels on the debate over women and
cultural accommodation, in which we show how conflicts
thinking—taken outside the context of actual disputes and
redeployed as a modality for theory—can offer new ways of
approaching problems in feminist legal theory.159 In that article, bringing together insights about transdisciplinary conflicts, legal technique, and the constraint of form, we suggested
that the very nuts-and-bolts technicalities that render conflicts
so implausible as a source of insight and strategy are what,
ironically, give the field its potential for feminism:
156
MARILYN STRATHERN, THE GENDER OF THE GIFT: PROBLEMS WITH WOMEN AND
PROBLEMS WITH SOCIETY IN MELANESIA 180–82 (1988).
157
Riles writes:
[A]n ethnography of lawyers in practice suggests that such [critiques
of legal form] are deficient in two crucial aspects. First, they take
too simplistic a view of practitioners’ commitments to their tools. A
lawyer may assert that the language of a statute constrains and
also, at another moment, assert that it does not. Far from being a
naive formalist, she is actually a most sophisticated epistemologist:
she can take both positions at once . . . . Second, such arguments
fail to account for the appreciation for the craft of legal form, the
pleasure and satisfaction and power and also humility of skating a
perfect figure eight, knowing that it has been skated countless times
before . . . .
It is in this complicated sense that I will speak of legal technique
as having certain degree of agency of its own. Now, to be clear, our
tools do not turn us into automatons; technology can always be
resisted, or broken, or abandoned, or tinkered with, or replaced
altogether, or ignored. But as anyone who has ever used a word
processor, or picked up a tennis racquet, or ridden on a subway
surely knows, our tools also shape how we think, what we aspire to
achieve, where we choose to go.
RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 32, at 71–72.
158
Riles identifies what she terms the “placeholder” effect of legal technique:
“The placeholder’s central feature is that it forecloses a question . . . for the
moment—not by resolving it, but by papering over it—by creating a provisional
solution subject to future reevaluation.” Id. at 176. In other words, legal technique is not concerned with “the utopian time of the distant future”; instead, it is a
device for producing near futures. Id. at 175.
159
Knop, Michaels & Riles, From Multiculturalism, supra note 33; cf. Roxana
Banu, A Relational Feminist Approach to Conflict of Laws, 47 MICH. J. GENDER &
LAW (forthcoming 2017) (conversely, bringing feminist legal theory to bear on
conflict of laws).
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[T]hese technicalities bring to the fore a vital level of detail
that feminism/culture analyses must generate from first
principles—and seldom achieve. Moreover, . . . as a matter of
sociology of knowledge, adhering to the constraints of form
that characterize conflicts technicalities more often opens up
an alternative resolution, or indeed alternative questions for
theory and practice . . . .160

In this Part, we will show, with reference to the reopening
of the Comfort Women issue, that conflict of laws reveals, tolerates, and enables an almost unfathomable proliferation of temporalities in space.
A. Private
Unlike the postwar Tokyo war crimes trials and the lumpsum settlements between states, which sought to bring closure
once and for all, private-law doctrines offer far more quotidian
pathways forward.161 One avenue left unresolved by the December 28 agreement, for example, is a private lawsuit with
links to more than one jurisdiction.162 One could imagine,
therefore, a torts case brought in California by individual Korean Comfort Women against an individual former Japanese
soldier or brothel operator with bank accounts in California
regarding a “comfort station” in Korea.163 Or again, one could
imagine a lawsuit in Japan by individual Korean Comfort Women against the Japanese men who coerced or sold them into
the Comfort Women system in China. Or one could imagine
that the Korean Comfort Women who recently won damages for
defamation from a Korean professor over her book urging a
160

Knop, Michaels & Riles, From Multiculturalism, supra note 33, at 594.
Consistent with newer approaches to closure, states may choose to acknowledge such remaining legal openings publically. Announcing the Mau Mau
settlement in Parliament, the British Foreign Secretary stated: “It is of course
right that those who feel they have a case are free to bring it to the courts.
However we will also continue to exercise our own right to defend . . . .” Statement
to Parliament on Settlement of Mau Mau Claims, supra note 48.
162
See supra note 22 (discussing opposing views on whether the December 28
agreement bars private suits).
163
See, e.g., Judgment of the Tokyo Women’s Tribunal, supra note 3, at 52–59
(describing the sexual enslavement of Korean women and girls with reference to
testimony before the Tribunal). Note that the hypotheticals we give here do not
raise two problems of legal time often found in campaigns for redress for historical
injustice. There is no issue of inter-generational responsibility since the plaintiffs
are the Comfort Women themselves, as opposed to their descendants, and no
issue of retroactivity arises since there is a strong case that the harms they
suffered were illegal under both domestic and international law at the time they
occurred.
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more nuanced view of the lives of women in the brothels164
might want to enforce that Korean judgment against the defendant’s assets in another country.165
For some, the private nature of conflict of laws is part of the
problem because it seems to risk taking politics out of the
equation.166 While we do not wish to rule out other valuable
areas of redress, a private lawsuit holds out the hope of a new
approach developed through the lens of the concerns and specific experiences of real people in real places. In the aftermath
of a political solution, namely, the December 28 agreement,
activists may wish for a genre of engagement that does not link
the resolution of the Comfort Women issue to geopolitics, trade,
and other issues of high diplomacy in the way that politics is
prone to do. Prominent Japanese feminist sociologist Chizuko
Ueno shares the feminist concerns canvassed earlier167 that
individual women and their individual experiences of wartime
sexual violence are being subsumed in the competing narra164
In January 2016, a Seoul court ordered a Korean professor of Japanese
literature to pay damages to nine Korean Comfort Women for defaming them in
her book, which depicted a range of relations between Japanese soldiers and
Comfort Women from rape to prostitution to a “comradelike relationship.” See
Choe Sang-Hun, Professor Ordered to Pay 9 Who Said ‘Comfort Women’ Book
Defamed Them, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/
14/world/asia/south-korea-park-yu-ha-verdict.html [https://perma.cc/9N5SXJAQ].
165
Indeed, a wide range of individual or collective private causes of action
related to the Comfort Women might arise. A California court recently dismissed
a case brought by Korean Comfort Women against a Japanese newspaper publisher whose paper had espoused the view that the Comfort Women were paid
volunteers and had called for an end to references to their “coercive recruitment.”
You v. Japan, No. C 15-03257, 2015 WL 7454031 at *1–3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24,
2015). The case was dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction over the publisher, but the court might have found otherwise had the online articles been
substantially directed at the Japanese diaspora in the United States, for instance.
166
A classic critique is Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of Private International Law,
7 WISC. INT’L L.J. 149, 177 (1988). Within private law, a variation would be those
authors who argue that sexual slavery should be prosecuted as such and not as a
tort because tort does not capture the nature of the harm. See, e.g., Jan Klabbers,
Doing the Right Thing? Foreign Tort Law and Human Rights, in TORTURE AS TORT:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION 553, 556–59 (Craig Scott ed., 2001); Nathan J. Miller, Human Rights
Abuses as Tort Harms: Losses in Translation, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 505 (2016).
This critique depends on a standard view of the bilateral relationship in private
law. Contra BILSKY, supra note 30, at 264–65 (referring to Hanoch Dagan and
Avihay Dorfman’s alternative view). Note too that Jan Klabbers assumes that
litigation “starts from the mistaken presumption that political problems can ever
be ‘solved’ to begin with. Instead, we may have to get accustomed to the idea of
having to live with ambivalence, and organise our political behaviour accordingly.” Klabbers, supra, at 566. On our account, conflict of laws does not make
this mistake.
167
See supra subpart II.D.
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tives and agendas of others that, in turn, may impact their
possibilities for recovery.168 Among these grand narratives,
she identifies not only patriarchal and revisionist accounts that
characterize the Comfort Women as willing prostitutes, but
also victim-centered accounts that foreground racism, ethnic
genocide, and violence, leaving no room for women’s agency.
Ueno writes:
The lawsuits brought by the former “comfort women” for
individual compensation and formal apology from the Japanese government are remarkable in the sense that they refuse to subsume the survivors’ individual rights under
national interests . . . . If their claim succeeds in establishing
the logic that “My body and my life do not belong to the state”,
the paradigm of the modern nation-state will be seriously
imperiled. The same logic is available to men as well . . . .
This interpretation, nuanced though it may seem, is provisional, as a new narrative can create an alternative view at
any moment . . . . I do not subscribe to the view that entire
historical projects serve a single truth, or that conflicting
narratives must be reconciled for the purpose of promoting
“truer” truths. Instead, what I propose here is a project of
multiple histories in which reality may be seen in different
ways from different perspectives. What is required is an imagination broad and generous enough to recognize simultaneously unfolding multiple realities some of which may be
invisible to you or even to me, but quite real to the other we
address, and want to be heard by.169

Thus, a private lawsuit provides individual victims with a
chance to frame the claim in their own terms. In effect, it is
diplomacy from the ground up: driven by the victims themselves, and in which the alleged perpetrators must respond,
also as individuals. What is hopeful about the private claim,
moreover, is precisely its partiality. Any lawsuit, by individual
women against individual men, can claim to resolve only a
sliver of the more general problem. It makes no claim to be a
totalizing solution to or narrative about the Comfort Women
controversy; it concerns only the specific obligations of these
parties to one another.
168
Chizuko Ueno, Narratives of the Past: Against Historical Revisionism on
‘Comfort Women,’ in APPROCHES CRITIQUES DE LA PENSÉE JAPONAISE DU XXE SIÈCLE
[CRITICAL READINGS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY JAPANESE THOUGHT] 303, 321 (Livia Monnet ed., 2001); see also UENO, supra note 23, at 69–105.
169
Ueno, supra note 168, at 322–23. Cf. Yang, supra note 117, at 57–61,
66–68 (addressing the problem of positionality and advocating the rehabilitation
of collective and personal memories to contest official representations of history).
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For the sake of simplicity, we will work with the hypothetical example of the torts case brought in California by Korean
Comfort Women against a former Japanese soldier or brothel
operator with bank accounts in that state. We use California
as the forum because of its well-developed twentieth-century
conflicts jurisprudence and elaborate contemporary techniques. To be clear, we are not proposing that anyone bring
such a lawsuit—although it might be that some would wish to
do this—nor do we attempt to predict what a California court
would decide. Our interest in this hypothetical is in thinking
through the conflict-of-laws approach to openness and closure
for issues of historical injustice as diffused across time and
space, and to ask what it would mean for us as feminists to live
through this moment by refashioning some of the conflicts lawyer’s techniques. What we offer here, then, is an ethnographically informed deployment of conflict-of-laws techniques—one
that is, like all ethnographic experiments, inevitably quite different from those produced by the subjects themselves. Methodologically speaking, we join here with a growing body of work
by anthropologists that, rather than treating knowledge practices they encounter as mere objects of description, experiments with thinking through these practices, treating them as
theoretical techniques.170
B. Noticing Time Across Space
In a private lawsuit, the openness of an issue is addressed
through statutes of limitations. The defendant in our hypothetical California lawsuit would immediately file for dismissal
on the ground that the limitation period for a claim in California has already expired, and time has therefore run out. But in
a suit with a foreign element, that is, a conflicts case, the defendant’s assertion that the claim is time barred raises the choiceof-law question: whose statute of limitations governs this
claim?171 Should the court look to the statute of limitations of

170
See DOUGLAS R. HOLMES, ECONOMY OF WORDS: COMMUNICATIVE IMPERATIVES IN
CENTRAL BANKS (2014); EDUARDO KOHN, HOW FORESTS THINK: TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY BEYOND THE HUMAN (2013); BILL MAURER, MUTUAL LIFE, LIMITED: ISLAMIC BANKING,
ALTERNATIVE CURRENCIES, LATERAL REASON (2005); MIYAZAKI, supra note 136;
STRATHERN, supra note 156; Eduardo Viveiros De Castro, Cosmological Deixis and
Amerindian Perspectivism, 4 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 469 (1998).
171
In conflict of laws, the question of the applicable law is separate from the
prior question of jurisdiction. Thus, a court might decide to hear a case but apply
another state’s limitations period.

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-4\CRN401.txt

892

unknown

Seq: 40

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

22-MAY-17

15:44

[Vol. 102:853

California (where the suit is brought), of Korea (where the torts
occurred),172 or of Japan (where the defendant is domiciled)?
In this respect, a conflict-of-laws approach to historical
injustice is less open than international criminal law. In international criminal law, it is increasingly accepted as customary
international law that statutes of limitations do not apply to
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.173 In
other words, the past is never and nowhere closed by law.
There is also treaty law on this point,174 although the nonapplicability of statutes of limitations with retroactive effect has
been challenged in international and domestic courts as a violation of the defendant’s human rights, with courts reaching
differing outcomes.175 In a certain way, transitional justice is
temporally similar to international criminal law. A framework
originally devised to facilitate reconciliation in countries undergoing transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, it is now
increasingly used to respond to historical injustices in societies
not undergoing regime change.176 Particularly in the latter
172
A tort is traditionally deemed to have occurred where the last act that
perfected the tort occurred, or in more modern terms where the “center of gravity”
of the elements of the tort is located. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 394 (6th ed. 2010). In this case, this is clearly Korea: this is
where the defendant allegedly committed the acts in question and also the domicile of the plaintiffs.
173
See Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Justice Delayed, Not Denied: Statutory Limitations and Human Rights Crimes, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 335, 348–56 (2012). But see
You v. Japan, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (rejecting this argument
because the Comfort Women plaintiffs did not offer any authority).
State practice does not currently make reparations claims for these crimes
imprescriptible. See Hessbruegge, supra, at 372–84. In comparison, the U.N.
Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy only asks that domestic statutes of
limitations for violations that do not constitute international crimes, including
those applicable to civil claims, not be “unduly restrictive.” U.N. Basic Principles
on the Right to a Remedy, supra note 46, ¶ 7.
174
See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73 [hereinafter 1968 Treaty]; European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, Jan. 25, 1971, ETS No. 82,
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/
090000168007617f [https://perma.cc/UB96-XPY9]. The Comfort Women system could be characterized as a crime against humanity as well as a war crime.
See Judgment of the Tokyo Women’s Tribunal, supra note 3, at 188–89. Japan,
South Korea, and the United States are parties to neither treaty.
175
See, e.g., Hessbruegge, supra note 173, at 364–68. At the time the 1968
Treaty, supra note 174, was concluded, many states argued that its application to
war crimes and crimes against humanity “irrespective of their date of commission,” id. art. 1, violated the prohibition on the retroactive application of criminal
offences (found, for example, in the ICCPR, supra note 103, at art. 15).
176
See Paige Arthur, How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 321 (2009) (giving an intellectual history of transitional justice).
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role, transitional justice resembles international criminal law
in that it understands any historical claim as always morally or
politically openable.177 Compared to a peace treaty, however,
the conflicts approach is more open because peace treaties, as
we saw, generally established a relationship between states by
closing off individual claims.
What conflict of laws particularly registers is that legal time
is not simply a reflection of calendar time or historical time.178
The law’s clock starts, runs, stops, and restarts differently in
different places. The very first move a court must make in a
choice-of-law analysis is to notice legal time across space.179
Thus a court must recognize that legal time is local and acknowledge a plurality of legal approaches to discerning an
endpoint to any highly charged political moment.180 In our
hypothetical, the court would discover that the relevant California statute of limitations for these actions is two years from the
date on which the tort was committed,181 whereas the relevant
Korean statute of limitations is three years from the date on
which the plaintiff became aware of the identity of the
tortfeasor.182 Under Japan’s Civil Code as interpreted by the
courts, the relevant statute of limitations is three years from
the date when the identity of the perpetrator became known or
177
See, in the context of statutes of limitations, Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes
of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of Reparations Litigation, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 68 (2005) (using the case of the 1921 Tulsa race riots—in which a
white mob killed up to 300 African-Americans, left thousands homeless, and
burnt a largely Black community to the ground—to argue that time-barring
claims for reparations is against public policy).
178
Cf. EMILY GRABHAM, BREWING LEGAL TIMES: THINGS, FORM, AND THE ENACTMENT
OF LAW 6 (2016) (arguing that our relationship with objects such as case reports,
medical reports, files, and classification systems and ways of using them to do law
create legal time); CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, A MOMENT’S NOTICE: TIME POLITICS ACROSS
CULTURES 1 (1996) (seeing time as cultural and analyzing “the ways that people
talk about and use representations of time in social life, ideas that developed
independently of whatever ‘real time’ might be”) By “legal time,” we mean issues
such as the definition of a “day” for the purposes of filing a document, as distinct
from the time of the law’s own existence. For a study of the latter, see KUNAL M.
PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1790–1900: LEGAL
THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM 15–16, 25–66 (2011) (probing, for example, the “immemoriality” of the common law and its implications for the common law’s ability
to change).
179
See Alexandre Pilenko, Le droit spatial et le droit international privé dans le
projet du nouveau code Civil français [Spatial Law and Private International Law in
the Draft of the New French Civil Code], 6 REVUE HELLÉNIQUE DE DROIT INT’L 319,
351 (1953) (stating that “[s]i on parle du temps, il faut parler, aussi, de l’espace”
[“if we speak of time, we must also speak of space”]).
180
Cf. David M. Engel, Law, Time, and Community, 21 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 605
(1987).
181
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 335.1 (West 2003).
182
Minbeob [Civil Act], Act No. 471, Feb. 22, 1958, art. 766(1) (S. Kor.).
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twenty years from the date of the harm, whichever is longer.183
We will assume that the plaintiff did not know the identity of
the defendant until less than three years ago. Accordingly, the
statute of limitations would have run if this were a purely domestic Californian case, but not if it were a purely Korean case
brought in Korea or a purely Japanese case brought in Japan.
Even if a California court concludes that it should apply
the Korean or Japanese statute of limitations instead of its
own, conflicts doctrine recognizes that it may not do so exactly
as a Korean court or a Japanese court might. In California, a
doctrine of equitable tolling gives the court discretion to avoid
the strict application of a statute of limitations where justice so
demands.184 The Supreme Court of Korea, likewise, has allowed individual claims for wartime compensation to proceed
despite the Korean statute of limitations.185 The application of
Japan’s statute of limitations may involve, on the one hand, the
theory of Ausschlussfrist or délai préfix, according to which the
passage of time extinguishes the right altogether, and, on the
other, the finding that interpreting the time bar as Ausschlussfrist would be contrary to ideals of justice and fairness in cases
of postwar reparations claims.186 Our conflicts inquiry could
183
See MINPO [CIV. C.] art. 724 (Japan) (“The right to demand compensation for
damages in tort shall be extinguished by the operation of prescription if it is not
exercised by the victim or his/her legal representative within three years from the
time when he/she comes to know of the damages and the identity of the perpetrator. The same shall apply when twenty years have elapsed from the time of the
tortious act.”); Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 22, 2011, Hei 23 no. 236 SAIKO
SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHU MINJI [SAISHU MINJI] 443, 446 (Japan); Saiko Saibansho [Sup.
Ct.] Jan. 29, 2002, Hei 14 no. 56, 1 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 218,
222 (Japan); Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 16, 1973, Sho 48 no. 27, 10 SAIKO
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1374, 1375 (Japan); Saiko Saibansho [Sup.
Ct.] Nov. 30, 1967, Sho 42 no. 89 SAIKO SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHU MINJI [SAISHU MINJI]
279, 280 (Japan); see also MINPO [CIV. C.] art. 166 (Japan) (“The extinctive prescription commences to run when it has become possible to exercise the right.”).
184
Equitable tolling applies when extraordinary circumstances make it impossible for a plaintiff to file the claim on time. On this basis, it could be argued that
our hypothetical suit is also not time-barred under California law. See You v.
Japan, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1148–49 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
185
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
186
See Bong, supra note 97, at 197–200. Anthropologist Yukiko Koga describes how the ideals of justice and fairness have prevailed over the time bar in
several cases brought by Chinese victims of wartime forced labor, contrary to the
conventional wisdom that the plaintiffs’ Japanese lawyers were “insane” to try to
overcome the statute of limitations. Koga, Between the Law, supra note 97, at
420–21 (quoting Japanese lawyer Hayashi Toshitaka).
Although lower Japanese courts have quite often courageously mapped out
new ways of thinking about important issues of social justice in cases ranging
from environmental damage to minority rights to the presence of U.S. bases and
national electoral politics, such decisions usually have been summarily overturned on appeal as higher courts shy away from issuing rulings that directly
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go on, then, as some conflicts cases have,187 to ask whose
sense of justice and fairness applies: the forum’s, or that of the
foreign legal system?
This inquiry into endpoints also brings the court into intellectual contact with the postcolonial histories at issue in this
case. On one legal approach, the relevant statute of limitations
would be the statute in force at the time the harms occurred.
But what are “Korea” and “Korean law” for these purposes?
When the Comfort Women system was instituted for the Japanese troops before and during World War II, Korea was already
a Japanese colony.188 Its legal system consisted of a complex
mix of national law and imperial law. Was Korea a territory of
Japan, a colony, or an occupied state?189 If the court were to
conclude instead, as many scholars recommend, that the forum apply the current law of the foreign jurisdiction,190 it
conflict with government policy. See generally FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987). In this vein, consider the overruling of a lower
court’s judgment that the legislature’s failure to pass a reparations law regarding
the Comfort Women was unconstitutional. Bong, supra note 97, at 194–95; The
“Comfort Women” Case, supra note 101. In an analogous case involving forced
labor, for example, a Japanese district court waived the statute of limitations bar
to the claim on the ground that to refuse to allow such claims to go forward would
be contrary to the ideal of justice and fairness. Koga, Between the Law, supra
note 97, at 405 (internal citations omitted); see also Hiroshi Matsubara, Mitsui
Case Breaks New Ground for Wartime Redress, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 27, 2002), http:/
/www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2002/04/27/national/mitsui-case-breaks-newground-for-wartime-redress/ [https://perma.cc/ELQ3-FQPG]. The decision was
overturned by the High Court on appeal. Bong, supra note 97, at 199; Fukuoka
Koto Saibansho [High Ct.] May 24, 2004, Hei 14 (ne) no. 511, 1875 HANREI JIHO 62
(Japan).
187
Compare Desautels v. Katimavik [2003], 174 O.A.C. 201 (Can. Ont. C.A.)
(stating, in the concurrence, that a forum court could not avoid a foreign limitations period by exercising its inherent discretion), with Mercantile Mut Ins (Austl)
Ltd v Neilson, [2004] WASCA 60 (finding that the forum judge must look to how
foreign judge would exercise discretion regarding the time bar in the foreign law),
rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Neilson v Overseas Projects Corp of Victoria Ltd
[2005] HCA 54 (Gummow and Hayne JJ. finding, on a different point about discretion, that if expert evidence fails to establish how a foreign court would exercise its
discretion, the forum court must presume that it would be exercised the same way
as in the forum court). For a recent example of the complexity of exercising
discretion as a foreign judge would, see Ministry of Defence v. Iraqi Civilians
[2016] UKSC 25 (appeal taken from Eng.).
188
See MARIE SEONG-HAK KIM, LAW AND CUSTOM IN KOREA: COMPARATIVE LEGAL
HISTORY 181 (2012).
189
See id. (describing shifts in Japan’s own legal interpretation of Korea’s legal
status from the early 1900s through World War II).
190
See Mann, supra note 31, at 233. But see PATRICK COURBE, LES OBJECTIFS
TEMPORELS DES RÈGLES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [THE TEMPORAL OBJECTIVES OF THE
RULES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW] 251 (1981) (arguing that courts should interpret the conflict between the old and new laws of the foreign jurisdiction as a
conflict-of-laws problem of its own to be addressed using the forum’s conflicts
principles).
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would look to postwar Korean law rather than to the prior
colonial law. One legacy of Japanese imperialism, though, has
been the legal transplantation of many key elements of Japanese law to Korea, and for this reason, Japanese and Korean
procedural law are still quite similar.191 Indeed, on the applicable statute of limitations for torts, they are functionally identical.192 Ironically, the legacy of Japan’s colonization of Korea
would give the Korean plaintiffs a tactical advantage because
both Korean and Japanese laws favor the Korean plaintiffs.
Thus a seemingly mundane question in conflict of laws—
which jurisdiction’s statute of limitations applies—begins with
a core insight: legal time is local. It is politically as well as
spatially dispersed.
C. Relative Time
Conflict techniques also proceed from the strong normative
assumption that legal time is relative. In our hypothetical, the
judge must choose between the statutes of limitations of three
jurisdictions: California, Japan, and Korea. This decision does
not entail a normative choice of one over the other; it is not that
one is superior or preferable in some universal sense. Rather,
the choice is more narrow and technical: which of these applies
in this particular case? Other legal perspectives on time can
thus be relevant without being applicable, and inapplicable
without being wrong. The judge’s choice is a limited and circumspect one, made with full awareness that another court in
another jurisdiction might have good reasons to choose
differently.193
A California court would analyze the choice-of-law question for the statute of limitations independent of the choice-oflaw question for the underlying tort, such that the court might
find that the law of State A applies to the underlying substantive claim while the law of State B applies to whether or not the
statute of limitations has run on that claim.194 Thus, even if
191
See KIM, supra note 188, at 271 (concluding that the drafters of the Korean
Civil Code, which includes the statute of limitations for tort, “made little attempt
to depart drastically from Japanese law”).
192
See supra notes 182–183.
193
See Knop, Michaels & Riles, From Multiculturalism, supra note 33, at
634–35.
194
Courts traditionally treated statutes of limitations as procedural and mandated that the court apply its own statute of limitations to the case in much the
same way as it would follow its own procedural rules. See Sam Walker, Forum
Shopping for Stale Claims: Statutes of Limitations and Conflict of Laws, 23 AKRON
L. REV 19, 21–22 (1989). Underpinning this view was the traditional common law
characterization of statutes of limitations as part of the legal process and as a
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California’s own statute of limitations would direct the court to
dismiss, its conflicts law might lead it to hear the case on the
basis of the application of a foreign statute of limitations. Or,
conversely, even if the foreign state’s law would draw the past
to a close, the forum might adjudicate a wrong committed there
nonetheless because the forum’s conflicts law directs the court
to apply some other statute of limitations—either its own or
that of yet a third jurisdiction.
What intrigues us here is the normative assumption behind such strategic possibilities. The conflicts approach to
time, unlike international criminal law’s approach, for example, is not universal. It acknowledges that individuals from
different states, and even states beyond those of the individuals’ nationality or that of the territory where the wrong occurred, each bring to the dispute their own local
understandings of when a matter might be open or closed.

limitation on the remedy, rather than the right to recover. See David G. Owen,
Special Defenses in Modern Products Liability Law, 70 MO. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2005);
Walker, supra, at 21–22; Ibrahim J. Wani, Borrowing Statutes, Statutes of Limitations and Modern Choice of Law, 57 UMKC L. Rev. 681, 685–86 (1989). During
the twentieth century, this approach met increasing criticism, much of which
focused on the meaninglessness of suggesting that the legal right in a cause of
action remained even though a remedy was unavailable. See, e.g., James A.
Martin, Statutes of Limitations and Rationality in the Conflict of Laws, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 405, 419–20 (1980). Another concern was the incentive that existed to
forum shop for long limitation periods if the statute of limitations varied with the
forum. See CLYDE SPILLENGER, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 39 (2010); Robert
Allen Sedler, The Truly Disinterested Forum in the Conflict of Laws: Ratliff v.
Cooper Laboratories, 25 S.C. L. REV. 185, 197 (1973); Symeon C. Symeonides,
Louisiana Conflicts Law: Two “Surprises,” 54 LA. L. REV. 497, 532 (1994); Walker,
supra, at 19.
Approximately half of U.S. jurisdictions currently follow one of three modern
approaches. The first is to treat statutes of limitation as substantive: the limitations period comes from whichever jurisdiction provides the bulk of the substantive law. This approach has been codified in the Uniform Conflict of LawsLimitations Act, which has been adopted by seven states. Outside of the United
States, much of the common law and civilian world also follows this model. See
PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 175 (5th ed. 2010); STEPHEN G.A. PITEL ET AL.,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMMON LAW CANADA: CASES, TEXT AND MATERIALS
592–601 (4th ed. 2016); WEINTRAUB, supra note 172, at 72–73. Second, the U.S.
Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws goes a step further and does away with
the language of substance and procedure altogether in favor of a rebuttable presumption that the forum’s shorter statute of limitations applies. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). In general, unless the
exceptional circumstances of the case make such a result unreasonable, the
forum will apply its own statute of limitations barring the claim. The last modern
alternative is the approach followed by California courts. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2012: Twenty-Sixth Annual Survey,
61 AM. J. COMP. L. 217, 280 n.352 (2013) [hereinafter Symeonides, Choice of Law
in American Courts in 2012].
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Therefore, shutting down or reopening the past in any jurisdiction is always contingent and particular.
D. Mixing and Matching Time
Indeed, conflict of laws comfortably tolerates temporal
complexity. What if, as between California, Japan, and Korea,
the rules of conflict of laws themselves conflict? Can we have a
conflict of conflict of laws—a thinking in multi-temporal terms
about that very act of thinking?195 And can we carve up the
issues and imagine that, for example, Japanese law governs
whether the Comfort Women plaintiffs were falsely imprisoned
and California law decides whether that claim is time barred,
while Korean law governs whether they have a cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, for which California law determines the quantification of damages?
The answer is yes. Under a conflicts doctrine known as
dépeçage, literally “dividing or carving up,” the court slices the
issues so as to recognize that an injury has many different
angles and dimensions, each of which might fall under different authorities and have different sources of legitimacy. Furthermore, if the substance of the claim is split into different
issues that are not all governed by the same jurisdiction’s law,
then more than one jurisdiction’s statute of limitations may
likewise apply.196 The result is that some issues may be timebarred, while others are governed by a longer limitation period.
To some, this mixing and matching of time may sound
absurd and possibly dangerous. But it takes for granted something that pervades the experience of the Comfort Women issue: the way things bubble up, uncannily, and recombine in all
sorts of distant spaces, expected and unexpected. It is quite
literally the decentered global perspective—neither here nor
there—that Stuart Hall has termed “postcolonial.”197

195
As our Article is intended as an interdisciplinary experiment, we do not
pursue all of the possible doctrinal complexities. See, e.g., RICHARD GARNETT,
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 278–81 (2012) (discussing
the complex issue known as “renvoi”: once a court has determined that the applicable law is that of country X, does it apply the domestic limitation law of X even if
a court in X would not apply its limitation law on the facts of the case?).
196
On the view that a statute of limitations can be substantive rather than
procedural, see supra note 194.
197
See Stuart Hall, When Was ‘The Post-Colonial’? Thinking at the Limit, in THE
POST-COLONIAL QUESTION: COMMON SKIES, DIVIDED HORIZONS 242, 247 (Iain Chambers & Lidia Curti eds., 1996).
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IV
SPATIO-TEMPORAL DIFFUSION
The three conflict-of-laws techniques just described give us
a new appreciation for the challenges, consequences, and opportunities posed by spatio-temporal diffusion. In this light,
we now return to Comfort Women Trouble.
A. Noticing Time Across Space: Proliferation, Dispersion,
and Undecidability
Let us start with the most basic conflicts insight: that “the
problem” takes different forms in different jurisdictions. We
called this “noticing time across space” because when a harm
occurred, when it might come to an end, and when an issue
opens or achieves closure depend very much on where—on the
locales in which the harms, the remedies, the strategies, and
the responses are framed. Rather than understanding the following snapshots as pieces of a singular movement toward one
comprehensive resolution of the Comfort Women issue, we now
can notice how they refract the issue, changing time by changing place, opening it where it was closed, spreading it into
locales where it had no history, making past and present into
their own conflict of laws:
• South Korea, 2011: The Constitutional Court of Korea
holds the Korean government liable for violating the present-day constitutional rights of the Comfort Women
plaintiffs because it has not done enough to seek compensation from Japan.198
• 2011: Onward Towards Our Noble Deaths, by the Japanese manga artist Shigeru Mizuki, known for his children’s cartoons, becomes his first book to be translated
into English.199 A “devastatingly blunt portrayal[ ]” of his
time as a Japanese infantry soldier and of Japan’s wartime behavior, this illustrated memoir describes a “comfort station” in detail and is greeted as an important act of
witnessing.200
198
Lee, O-Soo v. Minister of Foreign Affairs, supra note 53. See also Monica
Eppinger, Karen Knop & Annelise Riles, Diplomacy and Its Others: The Case of the
Comfort Women, 6 EWHA J. GENDER & LAW 1, 23 (2014) (analyzing the judgment
and its legal, diplomatic, and political effects).
199
Matt Alt, Shigeru Mizuki’s War-Haunted Art and Life, NEW YORKER (Dec. 10,
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/shigeru-mizukis-warhaunted-creatures [https://perma.cc/3Y22-ZXYN]; Onward Towards Our Noble
Deaths by Shigeru Mizuki, DRAWN & QUARTERLY, https://www.drawnandquarterly.
com/onward-towards-our-noble-deaths [https://perma.cc/ERD6-UHCD].
200
Alt, supra note 199; Okano Yayo, Toward Resolution of the Comfort Women
Issue—The 1000th Wednesday Protest in Seoul and Japanese Intransigence, ASIA-
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• North Korea, 2012: South Korean activists representing
Comfort Women work with their North Korean counterparts on a statement calling for an apology from Japan.201
They are fined for making unauthorized contact with
North Koreans.
• Tokyo, 2012: A photography exhibit featuring close-ups of
the aged faces of living Comfort Women creates political
controversy for Nikon, which owns the gallery.202 When
Nikon tries to shut down the exhibit, a Japanese court
orders the corporation to let it proceed. In December
2015, the Tokyo District Court orders Nikon to pay damages to the photographer.203
• The Internet, 2012: Japanese and Korean activists file suit
demanding that the Japanese government release historical documents related to the Comfort Women.204 When a
Japanese court rules in their favor, they post the documents on the Internet.205
• New York City, 2013: As part of a travelling multimedia
exhibition, a Korean-born, New York-based artist designs
authentic-looking “Comfort Women Wanted” recruiting

PACIFIC J., Dec. 2012, at 1 (A. Tawara et al. trans.), http://apjjf.org/-Okano-Yayo/
3863/article.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GVK-GWGP].
201
See Adam Westlake, ‘Comfort Women’ Activists Fined for Making Illegal
Contact with North Korea, JAPAN DAILY PRESS (Sept. 21, 2012), http://japan
dailypress.com/comfort-women-activists-fined-for-making-illegal-contact-withnorth-korea-2112858/ [https://perma.cc/YTJ3-X8Y4]. The claims of North Korean Comfort Women are not covered by the 1965 bilateral agreement between
Japan and South Korea. See 1965 Agreement, supra note 90; Rob York & Hayoung Choi, Unresolved Issues Haunt Comfort Women Agreement, N. KOR. NEWS
(Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.nknews.org/2016/01/unresolved-issues-hauntcomfort-women-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/TZ8L-UJ8K].
202
See Miho Inada, Judge Orders Nikon to Hold ‘Comfort Women’ Photo Exhibit, WALL STREET J. (Jun. 25, 2012, 7:49 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/japanreal
time/2012/06/25/judge-orders-nikon-to-hold-comfort-women-photo-exhibit/
?mod=WSJBlog [https://perma.cc/4RUW-X5MV]; Miho Inada, Nikon Cancels
‘Comfort Women’ Photo Exhibit, WALL STREET J. (May 28, 2012, 7:52 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2012/05/28/nikon-cancels-comfort-womenphoto-exhibit/ [https://perma.cc/9MJ5-P3AX].
203
Korean ‘Comfort Women’ Photographer Wins Lawsuit Against Nikon, YAHOO!
NEWS (Dec. 25, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/news/korean-comfort-womenphotographer-wins-lawsuit-against-nikon-104837488.html [https://perma.cc/
282C-TJM9].
204
See Max Slater, Japan Court Orders Government to Disclose Treaty with
Korea on Sex Slavery, JURIST (Oct. 11, 2012, 10:35 AM), http://jurist.org/paper
chase/2012/10/japan-court-orders-government-to-disclose-treaty-with-koreaon-sexual-slavery.php [https://perma.cc/K7A7-39D6].
205
JWRC Home Page, CTR. RES. & DOCUMENTATION ON JAPAN’S WAR RESP., http:/
/space.geocities.jp/japanwarres/center/english/index-english.htm [https://
perma.cc/MV66-SBZS].
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posters that she displays as advertisements on a Times
Square phone booth and a Chelsea street.206

In each of these examples, the trauma of the past is very
much a problem for the present, whether it is the first person
account of long-kept secrets, the aging of biological bodies that
physically connects past to present, or performance art that
interpolates us into the past in the form of an advertisement
stylistically queued to its time. In his work on memory in the
aftermath of the Holocaust, historian Dominick LaCapra points
to the “repetitive temporality” of experiences and efforts to represent the trauma of extraordinary violence.207 This repetitive
quality—the way the past pops up again and again—has to do
with the larger impossibility of representing such trauma for
oneself or to others:
Trauma brings about a dissociation of affect and representation: one disorientingly feels what one cannot represent; one
numbingly represents what one cannot feel. Working
through trauma involves the effort to articulate or rearticulate affect and representation in a manner that may never
transcend, but may to some viable extent counteract, a reenactment, or acting out, of that disabling dissociation.208

The popularity in contemporary Japan of magical realist
novels in which characters moving through everyday life suddenly fall into a rabbit hole of time and find themselves in the
midst of violent scenes from World War II, or through happenstance come into contact with family secrets and the legacies of
family members’ wartime actions, gives expression to the experience of being caught in and tormented by the past, despite
one’s full integration into the present.209
One implication is that any particular moment of closure
produces traces or remainders for reopening elsewhere. In this
vein, the feminist philosopher and historian Elizabeth Grosz
has critiqued “the very idea that we can find a solution to . . .
206
See Chang-Jin Lee, Comfort Women Wanted, CHANGJINLEE.NET, http://
www.changjinlee.net/cww/index.html [https://perma.cc/4EMJ-QHHS]; Katherine Brooks, The History of ‘Comfort Women’: A WWII Tragedy We Can’t Forget,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 25, 2013, 8:52 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/11/25/comfort-women-wanted_n_4325584.html [https://perma.cc/
J7M4-WLR4].
207
DOMINICK LACAPRA, REPRESENTING THE HOLOCAUST: HISTORY, THEORY, TRAUMA 9
(1994).
208
DOMINICK LACAPRA, WRITING HISTORY, WRITING TRAUMA 42 (2014).
209
See, e.g., MATTHEW CARL STRECHER, DANCES WITH SHEEP: THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY IN THE FICTION OF MURAKAMI HARUKI (2002) (examining Murakami’s treatment of
the past).
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the question of violence.”210 Grosz borrows Jacques Derrida’s
term “undecidability” to highlight the violence at stake in any
political or legal decision that aims to resolve past acts of violence: “[N]o political protocol, no rhetorical or intellectual ploy
is simply innocent, motivated by reason, knowledge, or truth
alone, but carries with it an inherent undecidability, an inherent iterability or repeatability that recontextualizes it and frees
it from any specifiable or definitive origin or end.”211
From this point of view, an obsessive desire to reach resolution in the law encounters time and again the law’s own
undecidability:
Undecidability dictates that the signification and effect of
events or representations can never be self-present insofar as
they always remain open to what befalls them, always liable
to be placed elsewhere: in other words, it dictates that it is
only futurity, itself endlessly extended to infinity, that gives
any event its signification, force, or effect. Which has terrifying consequences for those who would like to correct situations or contexts here and now, and once and for all. What
the principle of undecidability implies is that the control over
either the reception or the effect of events is out of our
hands . . . .212

Some feminists have responded to this condition, in which
the past haunts the present and the future, with calls for more
“polytemporal” forms of politics: celebrations of nonlinear temporalities that would blend recollection and expectation, would
be “multidirectional,” and thus could “facilitate productive conversations between feminisms of the past and the present.”213
Victoria Browne proposes that
historical time should be understood as polytemporal. It is
an internally complex, “composite” time, generated through
the interweaving of different temporal layers and strands. As
such, there is no “one” historical time or temporal structure
within which diverse histories are all embroiled. On the contrary, there will always be multiple, shifting patterns of historical time, as different histories have their own mixes of
time and their own temporalities.214

210
211
212
213
214

ELIZABETH GROSZ, TIME TRAVELS: FEMINISM, NATURE, POWER 57 (2005).
Id. at 59.
Id. at 65.
BROWNE, supra note 77, at 2 (citations omitted).
Id.
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B. Mixing and Matching Time: Recognizing
Polytemporality and Being Out of Sync
If polytemporality sounds like a bizarre flight of theory, it is
not so different from the conflicts technique of dépeçage, in
which time is mixed and matched because each issue is potentially subject to the statute of limitations of a different jurisdiction. Moreover, the explicit nature of the expression of
polytemporality in conflicts helps us to notice similar
polytemporal exercises in other political and legal projects.
Consider the construction of time in the following remarkable
effort by the NGO community to address the Comfort Women
issue—a legal fiction that passed virtually unnoticed, or at
least unremarked on, other than by one of us whose analysis
reflects a conflict-of-laws sensibility.215
When global feminists turned their attention to sexual violence in armed conflict in the 1990s, there seemed to be little
prospect of achieving official justice for the increasingly frail
and elderly Comfort Women. The postwar Tokyo Tribunal had
long ceased to exist, and the International Criminal Court, not
established until 2002, would have no jurisdiction over earlier
international crimes.216 In response, women’s and human
rights NGOs from across Asia staged a Women’s International
War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japan’s Military Sexual
Slavery (the “Tokyo Women’s Tribunal”) in 2000 to prosecute
rape and sexual slavery in the Comfort Women system as
crimes against humanity.217 Despite its unofficial nature, the
Tokyo Women’s Tribunal adhered meticulously to legal
processes and formalities.218 Prosecution teams came from ten
countries; an amicus curiae represented Japan based on the
Japanese government’s position in related cases; sixty-four
215

Knop, supra note 24.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 11, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
217
Judgment of the Tokyo Women’s Tribunal, supra note 3. On the Tokyo
Women’s Tribunal, see, for example, Christine Chinkin, Peoples’ Tribunals: Legitimate or Rough Justice, 24 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 201 (2006); Alexis Dudden,
“We Came to Tell the Truth”: Reflections on the Tokyo Women’s Tribunal, 33 CRITICAL ASIAN STUD. 591 (2001); Knop, supra note 24; Yayori Matsui, Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery: Memory, Identity,
and Society, 19 E. ASIA 119 (2001); Indai L. Sajor, Challenging International Law:
The Quest for Justice of the Former “Comfort Women,” in GLOBAL ISSUES: WOMEN AND
JUSTICE (Sharon Pickering & Caroline Lambert eds., 2004); Rumi Sakamoto, The
Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery: A
Legal and Feminist Approach to the ‘Comfort Women’ Issue, 3 N.Z. J. ASIAN STUD.
49 (2001).
218
Vera Mackie, In Search of Innocence: Feminist Historians Debate the Legacy
of Wartime Japan, 20 AUSTL. FEMINIST STUD. 207, 207 (2005).
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Comfort Women attended; and the witnesses included two Japanese soldiers who testified about their participation in the
Comfort Women system.219 A panel of internationally recognized experts, including former international and national
judges, found the late Emperor Hirohito and nine other defendants guilty before an audience of over a thousand people and
subsequently issued a written judgment of over 250 pages.220
The Tribunal also received considerable media attention, enhanced by a lawsuit over the Japan Broadcasting Corporation’s
(“NKH”) decision to censor and alter a documentary about it at
the request of conservative Japanese politicians.221 Indeed,
the Philippine Supreme Court cites the judgment of this unofficial tribunal in its own Comfort Women judgment.222 In the
context of polytemporality and dépeçage, what is perhaps most
intriguing about the Tokyo Women’s Tribunal, and yet is
scarcely registered in the literature, is the novel temporal identity that it adopted for itself. The Tribunal asserted that it was
judging the crimes “as if it were a reopening or continuation” of
the official postwar Tokyo Tribunal and subsidiary trials.223 As
a practical legal matter, the fiction that the tribunal was sitting
in the 1940s overcame a series of time-related obstacles, including amnesties, statutes of limitations, and double jeopardy. This fiction also had the moral and political effect of
showing that the original tribunal could have convicted with
the legal and evidentiary resources available at the time.224
Further, as with dépeçage, the Tokyo Women’s Tribunal did
219

Judgment of the Tokyo Women’s Tribunal, supra note 3, at 3, 8–9.
See id.; Chinkin, supra note 217, at 214–15.
221
See “NHK ga Bangumi Kaihen” 200-man’en Baijou Meijiru Tokyo Kousai,
ASAHI SHIMBUN, Jan. 30, 2007, at 1; Matthew Penny, The NHK Comfort Women
Documentary – 10 Years Later, ASIA-PACIFIC J., http://www.japanfocus.org/
events/view/39 [https://perma.cc/94LX-5BL9]; Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.],
June 12, 2008, Hei 2007 (Ju) No. 808, 62 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 6 (Japan), http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2008.06.122007.-Ju-.No. .808.to.813.html [https://perma.cc/Q84N-DBHP]; see also Yayori
Matsui, Why Do We Sue NHK?, DOAM (July 24, 2001), http://www.doam.org/
index.php/projekte/menschenrechte/trostfrauen/273-pr-mr-cw-nhk-matsui
[https://perma.cc/V9MZ-H2DH] (describing the case from her perspective as
plaintiff and Chairperson of the Violence Against Women in War - Network Japan
(“VAWW-Net Japan”)); Lisa Yoneyama, Letter of Protest to NHK, KOREANSTUDIES.COM (Mar. 1, 2001), http://koreanstudies.com/pipermail/ksopen_korean
studies.com/2001-March/000213.html [https://perma.cc/ER37-Q3MP].
222
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, 10 nn.31–32 (S.C., Apr.
28, 2010) (Phil.), http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/
162230.htm [https://perma.cc/C83Z-UFXP] (describing the effort and legal expertise involved but stressing that the judgment was not legally binding).
223
Judgment of the Tokyo Women’s Tribunal, supra note 3, at 19 (emphasis
added); Knop, supra note 24, at 146.
224
Knop, supra note 24, at 147–48, 157–58.
220
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not retain its 1940s identity throughout the judgment. It also
went on to try present-day Japan; specifically, whether the
state had a duty to prevent and repair the crimes against the
Comfort Women and if so, whether Japan’s failure to fulfill this
duty amounted to a continuing breach of its responsibility.225
Yet, despite these temporal innovations, the Tokyo Women’s Tribunal and the larger impulse to make feminist politics
more “polytemporal” pay little attention to a crucial point about
Comfort Women Trouble: all of these repetitions, the way in
which what is repressed returns over and over, are engendered
by the spatial, or jurisdictional, dispersion of the problem. It is
not only that Comfort Women Trouble keeps reappearing; it is
that each time it seems to be put to rest in one locale, it reappears somewhere else. As space-times proliferate, a new kind
of problem—a new kind of harm—comes to characterize the
trans-local experience of injustice: other temporalities continually intrude, elsewhere, continually reappear unannounced
and uninvited, here and everywhere.
One of the features of this condition is that events seem
continually out of sync with one another. For example, Korean
feminist anthropologists have expressed confusion and even
exasperation at the obsession of Korean-Americans with the
Comfort Women issue. They argue that Korean women face
more pressing problems, such as economic inequality,226 and
they worry about the appropriation of the issue by Korean nationalists.227 To them, Korean-American women who agitate
225
See Judgment of the Tokyo Women’s Tribunal, supra note 3, at 205–53;
Knop, supra note 24, at 158.
226
See, e.g., Hae-Joang Cho Han “
” [ “Hae-Joang
, No. 24 (2004); Eun-shil Kim
Cho Han’s Third Letter”],
” [“Nationalist Dis“
course and Women: Toward a Critical Reading of Culture, Power, and Subject”]
(1994).
227
See, e.g., Hyunah Yang, Re-membering the Korean Military Comfort Women:
Nationalism, Sexuality, and Silencing, in DANGEROUS WOMEN: GENDER AND KOREAN
NATIONALISM 123, 129 (Elaine H. Kim & Chungmoo Choi eds., 1998) (arguing that
Koreans’ us/them attitude toward Japan casts Japan as the offender and solidifies Korea’s collective identity as the victim and, in turn, “provides convenient as
well as obfuscating logic through which complex issues such as the history of
Military Comfort Women have been explained”); Hae-Joang Cho Han, supra note
226, at 140 (noting that “when the Comfort Women issue exploded . . . in 1992,
the issue was promptly articulated in terms of . . . nation-state” and describing
her feelings of shock at the courageous testimonies but also a feeling of strangeness that “the sexual victimization of women is only problematized when it serves
nationalism”); Kim, supra note 226, at 41 (“The comfort women who were violated
by the Japanese military are a symbol of anti-imperialism that recreates the
suffering of the Korean people. Nationalist discourse denies the specificity of
women’s experience and universalizes them as a national issue by imposing a
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about Comfort Women are “behind” cutting-edge feminist positions. Some Korean-American scholars counter that the Comfort Women issue is not only a Korean issue but also a “KoreanAmerican” issue, with different implications for the latter than
for the former.228 For them, it is Korean feminism that is behind. This curious and disjunctive temporality is in part a
condition of the spatial diffusion of the event itself, accelerated
by the global circulation of people, resources, and ideas—a
diffusion that becomes more intensified and pronounced by the
very time lag between the events at issue and the present.
Here, a conflicts approach echoes insights from parallel
fields such as critical geography, phenomenological anthropology, and postcolonial theory. Feminist legal sociologist Mariana Valverde has powerfully argued that space and time need
to be treated together in socio-legal studies.229 Valverde borrows Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of the “chronotope,” itself transposed from 1920s science to literary analysis, to urge scholars
to “explore how different legal times create or shape legal
spaces, and how the spatial location and spatial dynamics of
legal processes in turn shape law’s times—how spatial dynamics ‘thicken’ time.”230
Working from a phenomenological perspective, likewise,
anthropologist Nancy Munn outlines a notion of spatiotemporalization that “views time as a symbolic process contingreater symbolic meaning on sexual violence. In other words, it is the Korean
people, not the women, who are taken to have been abused by the Japanese.
Since the nation itself is the problem, the crime of rape is not given much meaning
in the national discourse until it is committed by Japanese colonial rule.”).
228
Compare Kandice Chuh, Discomforting Knowledge: Or, Korean “Comfort
Women” and Asian Americanist Critical Practice, 6 J. ASIAN AM. STUD. 5, 9–10
(2003) (arguing that “the claiming of ‘comfort woman’ as an Asian American issue
might productively shape Asian Americanist inquiry insofar as it translates into
the advancement of a critique of the racialized and sexualized practices of the
intersecting modernities of Japan, Korea, and the United States . . . . ‘[C]omfort
woman’ . . . speaks to the operations of . . . gender, sexuality, race, class, empire,
and nation [and, as a] . . . formation that is excessive to any of those frames, . . .
leverages our critique of each, actively challenging Asian American studies to
recognize critically their intimate interrelation”), with Laura Hyun Yi Kang, Conjuring “Comfort Women”: Mediated Affiliations and Disciplined Subjects in Korean/
Asian Transnationality, 6 J. ASIAN AM. STUD. 25, 44, 47 (2003) (contesting what
she refers to as the “discursive Americanization” of Comfort Women and arguing
that “[t]he Korean/American conjuring[ ] of comfort women must resist the drawing of our intense investments toward the ‘back then’ and ‘over there’ if that would
make us forget the possibilities and pitfalls of our vexed and incomplete entanglements in the here and now”).
229
See Mariana Valverde, “Time Thickens, Takes on Flesh”: Spatiotemporal
Dynamics in Law, in THE EXPANDING SPACES OF LAW: A TIMELY LEGAL GEOGRAPHY 67
(Irus Braverman et al. eds., 2014).
230
Id. at 69.
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ually being produced in everyday practices.”231 Her feminist
redescription of Melanesian Kula exchange (once portrayed by
Malinowski in terms that emphasized the agentive power of
men conducting the exchanges) emphasizes the relational and
intersubjective construction of “space-times” in ways that valorize the most mundane forms of labor as constitutive of the
“givens” of time and space.232 For example, the physically laborious and time-delimited act of creating a canoe to be exchanged at a wedding or funeral for the islanders that Munn
studied, engenders the longer-term temporality of a debt that
must be reciprocated in future years or generations, but also
provides the means for geographical travel, literally bringing
one island into co-spatiality with the next.233 As she explains
elsewhere:
[T]ime-reckoning in general is constituted not merely in the
conceptual reference point or codified system of timing, but
also in the actor’s “attending to” such a reference point as
part of a project that engages the past and future in the
present—the space-time or “here-now” of the project. Actors
are not only “in” this time (space-time), but they are constructing it and their own time in the particular kinds of
relations they form between themselves (and their purposes)
and the temporal reference points (which are also spatial
forms).234

From this point of view, “[p]eople are ‘in’ a sociocultural time of
multiple dimensions (sequencing, timing, past-present-future
relations, etc) that they are forming in their ‘projects.’”235
Working in a postcolonial tradition, Michael Rothenberg
uncovers successive periods of cross-referencing between the
legacies of the Holocaust and colonialism, leading him to propose an ethics of “multidirectional memory” that would be
faithful to ways that collective memory is formed and reformed
in multicultural and transnational spaces, and thereby contribute to a better framing of justice in a globalizing world.236
231
Nancy D. Munn, The Cultural Anthropology of Time: A Critical Essay, 21
ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 93, 116 (1992).
232
See NANCY D. MUNN, THE FAME OF GAWA: A SYMBOLIC STUDY OF VALUE TRANSFORMATION IN A MASSIM (PAPUA NEW GUINEA) SOCIETY 9 (1992); see also ANNETTE
WEINER, WOMEN OF VALUE, MEN OF RENOWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES IN TROBRIAND EXCHANGE xvii (1976) (arguing that Malinowski “neglected the active role that women
play in exchange”).
233
See MUNN, supra note 232, at 8–9.
234
Munn, supra note 231, at 104 (internal citations omitted).
235
Id. at 116.
236
MICHAEL ROTHBERG, MULTIDIRECTIONAL MEMORY: REMEMBERING THE HOLOCAUST
IN THE AGE OF DECOLONIZATION 1–29 (2009). Rothberg’s idea of multidirectional
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For his part, the postcolonial theorist Dipesh Chakrabarty argues that the shared historical moment or present must be
appreciated as plural and “not-one.”237 The temporal condition
of postcolonial existence means living in “time-knots” composed of traces and fragments of the multiple pasts that we
inhabit, and also “the futurity that laces every moment of
human existence.”238
These “time knots” can take hold and block the present, as
some young feminists who organized the Tokyo Women’s Tribunal sought to explain to one of its judges, Professor Christine
Chinkin. Professor Chinkin told one of us of a reason that
young Japanese activists often gave her for their involvement
with the Tribunal.239 They felt that they could not address
their own current feminist problems until this past was somehow resolved or closed. Their efforts to advocate for other feminist causes in the present—whether problems of present-day
sexual violence, sexual harassment, sex tourism, or women’s
inequality in the household—kept bumping into the Comfort
Women problem in one way or another, they told her.
C. Relative Time: Ghosts
Once we notice time across space, we cannot avoid the
second premise of conflicts reasoning that we described: that
the temporality of Comfort Women Trouble is relative, different
in different places and for different people. In East Asia, one
particularly salient way of talking about Comfort Women
Trouble is as the trouble that the Comfort Women as ghosts
will pose for the living.
One often hears throughout East Asia that if nothing is
done about the Comfort Women problem before the death of
the last living Comfort Woman, their ghosts will haunt the
memory has recently been echoed in a feminist key, together with Astrid Erll’s
idea of “travelling memory.” See Ayse Gül Altinay & Andrea Peto, Introduction:
Uncomfortable Connections: Gender, Memory, War, in GENDERED WARS, GENDERED
MEMORIES: FEMINIST CONVERSATIONS ON WAR, GENOCIDE AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1, 4
(Ayse Gül Altinay & Andrea Peto eds., 2016); Astrid Erll, Travelling Memory, 17
PARALLAX 4, 10–16 (2011). Feminist theory emphasizes the significance of “context, positionality and multiple structures of inequality.” Gül Altinay & Peto,
supra, at 10.
237
DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND
HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE 250 (2000).
238
Id. at 112, 250.
239
Personal conversation between Christine Chinkin, Professor, London Sch.
of Econ. & Political Sci., and Annelise Riles (May 16, 2014).
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living forever.240 Sometimes this is expressed as a kind of
threat, as if justice will come from the afterlife. At other times it
is expressed in a tone of dread, as if one can never be sure of
how or what type of revenge an angry ghost might take. This
observation comes from men and women, from young and old,
from ordinary people and experts alike, often as an aside to
forms of argumentation more easily recognizable to a global
modernist legal audience.241
Understandings of the afterlife throughout East Asia are
shaped by shared Confucian and Buddhist traditions.242 In
the case of Japan, anthropologist Marilyn Ivy has written of the
need to “settle” the dead through burial practices.243 According to Ivy, Japanese make a distinction between “unsettled
newly dead” and “ancestral dead.”244 “Those that are not
remembered—or who have not been remembered adequately—
remain unsettled and are thus on the loose, dangerous: if the
living forget or neglect the dead, then the dead can haunt them
as ghosts.”245 Those who for whatever reason—improper burial or an unresolved matter during their lifetime—cannot “settle” become ghosts. As a result, a ghost is “someone who
should be absent but is uncannily present.”246 As anthropologist Lisa Yoneyama argues, the dead can be truth speakers
whose challenge or reproach brings danger: “The desire to ap240
See TINA CHEN, DOUBLE AGENCY: ACTS OF IMPERSONATION IN ASIAN AMERICAN
LITERATURE AND CULTURE 114–15 (2005) (describing how novelist Nora Okja Keller
became haunted after hearing a Comfort Woman bear witness, and “in order to
wrestle with the ghosts peopling her dreams, [she] had to imagine herself surviving ‘their daily lives, their physical and emotional anguish, the aftermath’”). Comfort Women also appear in other writers’ work as ghosts who have not attained
justice. Id. at 115.
241
As Marilyn Ivy observes of Japan, “traditional” beliefs and modalities of life
persist alongside, in the interstices of, globalized modernist discourses and indeed are often even creations of those modern discourses. See IVY, supra note
136, at 29–40.
242
See HEONIK KWON, AFTER THE MASSACRE: COMMEMORATION AND CONSOLATION IN
HA MY AND MY LAI 71 (2006) (observing that “Vietnam’s eclectic religious tradition
. . . has other ways to absorb untimely and genealogically disorderly death. The
names and identities of dead children may be brought to a Buddhist pagoda, a
Taoist temple, or the spirit shrine of a local medium”); MICHAEL DYLAN FOSTER, THE
BOOK OF YÔKAI: MYSTERIOUS CREATURES OF JAPANESE FOLKLORE 20 (2015) (describing
Buddhism and Shintoism as “the two dominant strains of thought . . . intertwined” in Japanese religion); Keith Howard, Preserving the Spirits? Rituals, State
Sponsorship, and Performance, in KOREAN SHAMANISM: REVIVALS, SURVIVALS, AND
CHANGE 187, 195 (Keith Howard ed., 1998) (elaborating how a Confucian understanding of death and the afterlife influence death ritual in Korea).
243
IVY, supra note 136, at 149–50.
244
Id. at 150.
245
Id.
246
Id. at 163.
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pease the dead rests on self-affirming forgetfulness; conversely,
reminders of the restless dead, unable ever to be fully conciliated, prevent such self-contentment.”247 People tell stories of
voices, singing or crying or speaking incomprehensible words,
of people appearing and then disappearing, of tormenting particular people whom they hold responsible for their anguish.248
One source of the remarkable political authority of the remaining Comfort Women is that everyone recognizes that they
will soon be dead.249 They could be thought of almost as “predead”: existing in a sense between life and death, as symbolized
by the many demonstrations in which they are offered the
empty chair in the Comfort Woman memorial statue that is
reserved for the dead.250 Stuck between the dead and the living, they speak for the Comfort Women who have already
passed on, and their presence raises the possibility that they
themselves, like those who went before them, could die angry.
Yoneyama finds that survivors of another war atrocity, the
atomic bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who have been
pressed into national service to tell their stories, carry the burden of speaking for, connecting with, and even consoling classmates, family members, or neighbors who did not survive the
bombing.251 In Korea, likewise, the feminist anthropologist
Eun-shil Kim has written about the surviving widows of the
Jeju Island massacres who, Kim argues, sealed off their memories and words, remaining in another time in order to protect
themselves and their sons from the past, and who now, confronted with demands that they tell their stories, find that there
are no words, persons, or actions that can serve as a bridge
between their time and others’ times.252 Kim writes that some
247

YONEYAMA, supra note 136, at 82.
See IVY, supra note 136, at 163–67.
249
Feminist theorists also bring attention to the specific temporality of the
human biological body in a way that is illuminating for the Comfort Women issue
as the number of survivors who might receive some form of compensation or
apology dwindles year by year. As Grosz points out, “[w]hereas time is a continuous movement, our time, the time of the living, is finite, limited, linked to mortality, and thus irreplaceably precious.” GROSZ, supra note 210, at 4.
250
See California City Unveils Memorial Statue of Korean ‘Comfort Woman,’
JAPAN TIMES (July 31, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/07/31/
national/california-city-unveils-memorial-statue-of-korean-comfort-woman/
[https://perma.cc/K27Z-G66S] (showing a photograph of a Comfort Woman
seated next to a Comfort Woman statute with her hand on its arm).
251
See YONEYAMA, supra note 136, at 137–38.
252
Eun-shil Kim, Professor, Ewha Womans Univ., Address at Cornell Law
School Clarke Program in East Asian Law and Culture Colloquium: The Politics of
Speaking and Despair/Defilement Experienced by the 4.3 Holomong (Nov. 17,
2015) (transcript on file with authors) [hereinafter Kim, Politics of Speaking].
248
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widows decide to keep their secrets during their lifetime, and
yet in their final years they identify a spirit medium through
whom, after their death, they will choose to tell their stories.
The “trouble” of ghosts presents a stark rejoinder to those
who either hope or fear that the Comfort Women issue will
simply end and be forgotten with the biological death of the last
living survivor.253
The standard anthropological interpretation of such beliefs
and practices is psychoanalytic. It reads such experiences of
the “phantasmic” and the “uncanny” as evidence of societal
displacement and trauma.254 In so doing, it builds on a long
tradition of interpreting interactions with the dead as a medium for politics among the living.
If this is the case, then it is useful to pay attention to the
specific character of the trauma at issue here. Ghosts are different from gods in the East Asian conception.255 They can pop
up anywhere, but they are not everywhere at once. Moreover,
they are associated with (although also exceed) particular
places—a burial place, or a particular mountain or temple that,
in Ivy’s terms, “claim[s] jurisdiction” over them.256
Even more important, the problem of ghosts makes plain
that Comfort Women Trouble belongs not only to the victim, the
individual perpetrator, or the state. Ghosts can torment anyone and everyone all at once. They strike with impunity, in an
excessive manner, without respect for rules of standing, or res
judicata, or due process. The fear of Comfort Women ghosts is
thus symptomatic of a broader political, existential, and ontological condition. As problems diffuse through diasporic populations and across new communications technologies, other
253
See Mina Chang, The Politics of an Apology: Japan and Resolving the “Comfort Women” Issue, HARV. INT’L REV., Fall 2009, at 34, 37 (remarking that “[w]aiting
for the issue to fade away with the deaths of former victims would not only be
short-sighted, but also compound the crime in the eyes of supporters”).
254
See Andrew Alan Johnson, Progress and Its Ruins: Ghosts, Migrants, and
the Uncanny in Thailand, 28 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 299, 300 (2013) (evoking
psychoanalytic understandings of the uncanny to explain the experience of
haunting); Jean M. Langford, Gifts Intercepted: Biopolitics and Spirit Debt, 24
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 681, 704 (2009) (analyzing the presence of the dead in
terms of the psychoanalytic category of the uncanny); Jeffrey G. Snodgrass, Imitation Is Far More than the Sincerest of Flattery: The Mimetic Power of Spirit Possession in Rajasthan, India, 17 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 32, 48 (2002) (explaining
spirit possession in Freudian terms).
255
See Stephen Teiser, The Spirits of Chinese Religion, in RELIGIONS OF CHINA IN
PRACTICE 1, 11–14 (Donald S. Lopez, Jr. ed., 1996) (stating that “[l]ife takes six
forms: at the top are gods, demigods, and human beings, while animals, hungry
ghosts, and hell beings occupy the lower rungs of the hierarchy”).
256
IVY, supra note 136, at 144.
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times, places, and people become embroiled, engaged, and implicated. This condition is not so much a problem of the past
but a problem for the present. It is not just a problem for
victims so much as it is a problem for all of us, everywhere,
interpolated into the past in the present.257
A sophisticated debate about the responsibility of later
generations for historical wrongs has already expanded our
notion of responsibility beyond the singular perpetrator.258
Perhaps the danger of ghosts likewise provides a way to think
about expanding the notion of victimhood beyond the singular
victim. If the vocabulary of ghosts and ghostliness captures
something about the often traumatic experience of the spatiotemporal diffusion of violence and injustice, then it also cautions against the sometimes celebratory tone of certain feminist
theories of polytemporality. The “ghosts” of the past can strike
anyone, anywhere. Living with spatio-temporal diffusion can
be disorienting and painful.
V
SEQUENCING
We have shown how a conflict-of-laws approach resonates
with insights about time and space found in feminist social
theory, and indeed, how conflicts techniques can make more
salient and concrete ideas like polytemporality. In this Part, we
describe how a conflicts approach might help us to manage,
and act within, this spatio-temporal diffusion.
As we saw earlier,259 feminist historians insist on the undesirability, as well as the impossibility, of closure as a way to
guard against what Ghassan Hage calls “paranoid national257
Kim, Politics of Speaking, supra note 252. Cf. KOGA, supra note 52, at 199
(in her ethnographic account of a lawsuit brought in Japan by Japanese lawyers
representing Chinese plaintiffs injured by mustard gas from abandoned World
War II Japanese chemical weapons, quoting CATHY CARUTH, UNCLAIMED EXPERIENCE:
TRAUMA, NARRATIVE, AND HISTORY 24 (1996) that “history, like trauma, is never
simply one’s own, that history is precisely the way we are implicated in each
other’s traumas”).
258
In the context of the Tokyo Women’s Tribunal, Vera Mackie describes supporters of the Comfort Women survivors as “acting through a recognition of their
implication or imbrication in the events of the past,” where the notion of “implication” captures a more subtle “consciousness of connectedness” than guilt or innocence. Mackie, supra note 218, at 214–15 (citing Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Unquiet
Graves: Kato Norihiro and the Politics of Mourning, 18 JAPANESE STUD. 21, 30
(1998)). This connectedness might come from claiming a particular collective
identity, perceiving a similarity of situation, or reflecting on a shared “imbrication”
in a relationship of inequality. Id.
259
See supra notes 210–214 and accompanying text.
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ism.”260 Their work suggests the urgent need to creatively and
courageously reimagine what styles of engagement and what
modes of apprehension of the past might produce hopeful futures, beyond efforts at total closure, on the one hand, and
counter-efforts to keep things always open everywhere, on the
other. Victoria Browne acknowledges, however, that there is
“work to be done unpacking and explaining exactly what this
might mean.”261 On this point, they are reaching for images
and imaginaries.
Drawing on Eric Santner’s reflections on the legacy of fascism in Germany, anthropologist of Japan Marilyn Ivy aptly
calls for a cultural politics of “mourning” as a response to the
lingering effects of wartime violence and aggression in the
postmodern present.262 After all, mourning is a set of techniques for putting ghosts to rest. Mourning practices, she argues, are “more renunciatory modes and strategies of
engagement.”263 But mourning also takes a very specific form:
prayers, offerings, festivals, pilgrimages.264 Ritual—the practice of proper form in time—offers a “sediment[ed]” way through
memory to appease the ghosts of the past.265
Thus, Ivy calls for engaging the techniques and methods of
ritual to address a very real political problem. What form might
this take in the context of feminist futures? Here, we return to
the relatively humdrum and technical field of conflict of laws
for a possible way forward. We propose as a form the sequence
that conflict of laws applies to an ordinary issue of legal time,
the statute-of-limitations issue in our hypothetical. As we will
show, a choice-of-law analysis in conflicts proceeds in a series
of steps, with each step conjuring up a distinct spatio-temporal
horizon, that is, a different experience and imagination of the
space, the time, and the relevant agents.266 To do choice-oflaw analysis in conflicts is to demonstrate a commitment to
260
GHASSAN HAGE, AGAINST PARANOID NATIONALISM: SEARCHING FOR HOPE IN A
SHRINKING SOCIETY 20–21 (2003); see Kelly Oliver, Perpetual War, in FEMINIST TIME
AGAINST NATION TIME: GENDER, POLITICS AND THE NATION-STATE IN AN AGE OF PERMANENT
WAR 185, 200–01 (Victoria Hesford & Lisa Diedrich eds., 2008) (developing the
idea of “feminist time” as an alternative to “nation time in the form of paranoid
patriotism”).
261
BROWNE, supra note 77, at 2.
262
See IVY, supra note 136, at 14.
263
Id.
264
See id. at 145–46.
265
Id. at 14, 146.
266
Cf. Hirokazu Miyazaki, Documenting the Present, in DOCUMENTS: ARTIFACTS
OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE 206, 207 (Annelise Riles ed., 2006) (describing a similar
sequence of temporalities within the practice of filling out a bureaucratic record in
the context of mortuary exchange).
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moving through this sequence of steps. Each moment in the
sequence has its own spatio-temporal orientation and yet also
anticipates a moment in which that orientation will be superseded by a different space-time altogether. Through the constraint of form, as anthropologist Marilyn Strathern has called
it,267 a conflicts approach enables us to inhabit each of these
spatio-temporal positions in turn. In what follows, we first describe this sequencing effect and then return to its wider potential for a feminist politics of the future.
A. The Private Space-Time of the Wrong
As already noted, a choice-of-law analysis begins with the
parties, who must define for themselves the spatio-temporal
horizon of the wrong at issue. Plaintiff alleges that an injustice
occurred at a particular time and place. She takes us to that
time and place. Defendant, in turn, has multiple doctrinal vocabularies available for rejecting this temporal frame or offering
another. The point, however, is simply that the analysis begins
with an event, somewhere, sometime. This is the private
space-time of the wrong.
B. The Present Duration and Ambit of State Interests
While conflict of laws is driven by individual claimants, its
choice-of-law techniques recognize that it is also potentially
foreign affairs in a private-law key. That is, states are involved,
and the agency of individual parties must yield, at key moments, to that of states. Thus the view of conflicts thinking as
purely “private” and “individual” is not entirely accurate. In the
next steps of a choice-of-law analysis, a court adjudicating our
hypothetical lawsuit would reframe the dispute between the
plaintiff and the defendant as a conflict between states.
In the modern American choice-of-law methodology known
as governmental interest analysis, the court flattens and narrows the conflict to focus on the domestic interests of states.268
Specifically, governmental interest analysis approaches the
conflict between states as a conflict of state laws. Ventriloquized by the parties, each state is assumed to be asking to
have its law—in our hypothetical, its statute of limitations—
applied. The question for the court then becomes whether each
state’s demand is legitimate in this case. This is a delicate
267

See STRATHERN, supra note 156, at 180 and text accompanying note.
See Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-ofLaws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 237 (1958).
268
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question. Given the comparative and reflexive analysis that
came before,269 the court is well aware that its perspective is a
partial, situated one. Who is the court to make judgments
about the legitimacy of its own state’s or other states’ assertions of authority? The court therefore scrutinizes these assertions of authority on their own terms. To do so, it employs the
core modernist assumption that laws are tools with purposes.270 Governmental interest analysis evaluates whether
each state involved has an interest in seeing its law applied
from the point of view of the underlying purposes of that law.271
Accordingly, the court’s task is to analyze the purposes of the
tool to determine whether those purposes really come into play
in this dispute, to sharpen our understanding of the stakes for
each of the states involved.
On this reasoning, statutes of limitations, like all laws, are
tools of state policy. What are their purposes? Commentators
usually identify statutes of limitations as serving three purposes. Two concern substantive justice and pull in opposite
directions:272 to provide a venue for legitimate plaintiffs to exercise their rights to seek redress, and to protect defendants from
stale claims and thereby encourage freedom of action. Statutes
of limitations strike a balance between these two purposes by
notionally allowing the past to continue for a certain period of
time and then declaring the past closed. A third purpose is
more practical and utilitarian. Lawsuits are expensive, and
states must make choices about how to allocate their judicial
resources. Claims that exceed the statute of limitations will
not be heard because the forum cannot afford to allocate resources to this issue at this time and in this location.273
269

Supra subparts III.B–C.
For the argument that law is a specific social means rather than an end,
see, for example, RUDOLF VON IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (Isaac Husik
trans., Boston Book Co. 1913) (1903); Hans Kelsen, The Law as a Specific Social
Technique, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 80 (1941); see also ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS,
INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982) (arguing that most of twentieth-century American legal thought conceives of law as a means to an end).
271
BRAINERD CURRIE, The Verdict of Quiescent Years, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 584, 621 (1963) (“‘Interest’ . . . is the product of (a) a governmental policy and (b) the concurrent existence of an appropriate relationship between
the state having the policy and the transaction, the parties, or the litigation.”).
272
Traditionally, the justification for the existence of a limitations period was a
substantive one. There was a presumption that after a certain amount of time the
debt must have been satisfied. See Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in
Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of Formalism, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 925 (2004).
273
The distinction between the purposes of a fixed endpoint in legal time, in
turn, has implications for the reach of that endpoint in legal space. If the purpose
relates to scarce judicial resources, then the plaintiff presumably should be free to
pursue the claim in a jurisdiction where judicial resources are available. Dismis270
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Accordingly, if one purpose of the Korean statute of limitations is to provide plaintiffs with a venue for legitimate claims,
then that purpose clearly comes into play here. The plaintiffs
are Korean, and Korea has a legitimate interest in assuring that
Korean plaintiffs have a chance to have their claims heard. The
wrinkle for Japan in this case is that Japanese law actually
works against the Japanese defendant since under Japanese
law, as under Korean law, the claim could go forward. Since
the Korean and Japanese statutes of limitations are functionally identical, an application of Korean law cannot be objectionable for Japan. The only relevant purpose of the Japanese
statute of limitations in this case—to protect defendants from
stale claims—does not come into play since the Japanese statute of limitations does not bar the claim. Thus Japan has no
legitimate interest in seeing its law apply. Finally, California
has a legitimate procedural interest in ensuring that its judicial
resources are not wasted on outdated lawsuits since California
is the forum.
Between Korean law and California law, then, there is what
conflicts scholars call a “true conflict.”274 Each state has a
legitimate interest in the application of its own statute of limitations to this case.275 The court cannot evaluate whether Korea’s interest in seeing plaintiffs have their day in court is
greater or lesser than California’s interest in preserving judicial

sal should have no res judicata effect. In contrast, dismissal on the basis of the
first two purposes should have more universal implications and be binding on
future disputes.
Traditionally, a dismissal of a lawsuit on statute of limitations
grounds has been considered a dismissal “not on the merits,” and
thus it did not bar refiling the lawsuit in another state that had a
longer statute of limitations. This principle should hold firm in
cases in which the first forum state follows the traditional procedural characterization of statutes of limitation. In contrast, the premise underlying this principle is weakened when that state . . .
follows a substantive characterization.
Symeonides, Choice of Law in American Courts in 2012, supra note 194, at 310.
274
The term was originated by Brainerd Currie. See, e.g., Currie, supra note
268, at 263; see also Donald T. Trautman, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L.J 1612, 1619 (1981) (“Professor Currie’s interest analysis
uses the distinction between false and true conflicts to decide the issue of how far
a forum with some concern in a matter will go in judging that its concern should
be interpreted with moderation and restraint in light of another community’s
conflicting concern.”).
275
We leave aside here, for the sake of simplicity, whether any of these statutes of limitations can be extended through judicial discretion in particular circumstances. See supra notes 184–187 and text accompanying notes.
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resources because these interests are incommensurable, and
the court’s own perspective is situated, not universal.276
For our purposes, what is key in governmental interest
analysis is that the perspective shifts from the time-place of the
legal wrong done to individuals in the past, to the ongoing
interests of states in using time as a legal tool to achieve a
particular domestic purpose in the present, whether that purpose is protecting present-day Korean domiciliaries or preserving present-day Californian resources.
Obviously, in the context of gender, violence, and war
memory, this attempt to reduce the temporality question to
current “state interests” is almost farcically simplistic. To limit
Korea’s interest in this dispute to the plaintiff’s recovery or to
limit California’s interest to the protection of its judicial resources is patently absurd. And the purposes of statutes of
limitations, being myopically domestic, entirely ignore the ways
the harms, the interests, the parties, and even the truth spill
over from one place to another—the very complexities that the
previous analysis highlighted. But missing the complexities is
precisely the point. The trick of the technique is its claim to
(momentarily) turn a complex, multifaceted question about individual time in a particular place into a narrow technical one
about state time and state space. We will elaborate on the
value of this sequencing after we canvas two further steps in a
choice-of-law analysis.
C. The Fictional Time Horizon of Hypothetical Inter-State
Relations
In the case of a true conflict between the interests of two
states, a California court would turn to the doctrine of “comparative impairment” to break the tie.277 This doctrine directs
attention to the extent to which a state’s interests would be
impaired if its law were not applied in this case and tells the
court to apply the law of the state whose interests would be
most impaired. First proposed by William Baxter, it recognizes
that in addition to the “internal objectives” embodied in their
laws, states also have “external objectives,” including developing working relations with other states based on principles of
276
Governmental interest analysis has often harbored a preference for the
forum’s law. See, e.g., You v. Japan, 150 F. Supp 3d 1140, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(citing the proposition that only “an extraordinarily strong interest of a foreign
state” will overcome the forum’s interest in not hearing claims that are stale under
its own law) (citation omitted).
277
See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723–24 (Cal. 1976)
(explaining the comparative impairment approach).
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reciprocity.278 Comparative impairment analysis asks the
court to posit a fictional or hypothetical negotiation among
states in which the parties have roughly equivalent information
and bargaining power.279 In such a scenario, Baxter argues,
“each would cautiously give up what it wanted less to obtain
what it wanted more, each side’s perception of its own selfinterest and of the other’s objectives would sharpen, and the
final agreement would approximate maximum utility to
each.”280
Some courts have suggested that a state’s interests are
more impaired when a law enshrines a protective principle and
its own citizens come under the protection of that law,281 for
example, and others have suggested that a state’s interests are
less impaired when a law has not been enforced regularly or the
international trend is strongly against this law.282 Larry
Kramer suggests that when a purely procedural rule comes
into conflict with a more substantive rule, “[t]he forum sacrifices its procedural policies in favor of another state’s substantive policies, but gains by having its substantive policies
similarly preferred when they conflict with procedural rules in
cases outside the forum.”283 Thus, in a recent case involving
the confiscation of funds from Turkish bank accounts in the
context of genocide, the California court applied Turkey’s statute of limitations rather than California’s because the Turkish
law at stake involved a substantive regulatory matter, the
rights of depositors vis-à-vis banks, while California’s statute of
limitations was merely a docket-clearing mechanism as applied
to this case.284 In our hypothetical, a California court might
also be willing to defer to Korea because California arguably
has only a procedural interest in the application of its limitations period, namely, the allocation of judicial resources,
whereas the Korean interest goes to substantive matters.
The court’s entering into a fictional time-space of hypothetical negotiations broadens the frame beyond that of the parties,
278
See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 17 (1963); see also Harold Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California—A Restatement, 21 UCLA L. REV. 719 (1974).
279
Baxter, supra note 278, at 7.
280
Id.
281
See, e.g., Butler v. Adoption Media, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1041 (N.D. Cal.
2007).
282
See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Cont’l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 726 (Cal.
1978).
283
Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1021 (1991).
284
Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank AG, 548 F. App’x 461, 464–65 (9th Cir.
2013).
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the governments, and the activists engaged in this dispute.
The imagined interests of governments may differ from actual
governments’ wishes in this analysis because the imagined negotiation is not about whether the plaintiffs recover or not, but
about whether this is the kind of case in which the state really
cares about seeing its own legal principles applied, regardless
of the outcome. Likewise, in contrast to real negotiations centered on a particular issue—claims arising at the close of a war,
for example—we now imagine this claim alongside every kind of
case, from garden-variety contract disputes to environmental
issues and national security issues.
Coming after interest analysis, comparative impairment
analysis reverses the narrowing and flattening of the issues
involving states by explicitly bringing in the international dimension of the case. It asks the court to reflect carefully on
states’ interests over the longue durée, given principles of reciprocity and an inter-state, inter-temporal context in which
each state knows there will be repeat plays of the game. The
notion of comparative impairment reframes the problem of time
once again, not as a matter of domestic policy needs, but in
terms of its iterative dimension in the foreign affairs context.
D. The Present Time and Place of the Judgment
The final moment in the sequence returns us to the present
time and place of the case and, in particular, to the court’s real
present power over the defendant. In the United States, this is
a check in the form of a due process review.285 The question is
whether the application of the Korean statute of limitations by
a California court would violate the defendant’s constitutional
due process rights, given that an analogous purely domestic
case would be barred by the California statute of limitations. Is
the application of Korean law by a California court foreseeable
enough to this defendant that there is no unfair surprise?
Here, a court would likely find that the application of Korean
law is foreseeable since the events occurred in Korea and since,
in any case, Korean law is functionally the same as the defendant’s own national law (Japanese law). Hence, there is no
unfair surprise to the defendant. When we add to this that
current U.S. due process jurisprudence in the conflict-of-laws
arena posits an extremely permissive test,286 it is likely that the
285

HAY ET AL., supra note 194.
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (holding that as
long as a state has “a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor funda286
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application of a Korean statute of limitations would survive
constitutional challenges.
Again, what is important for our purposes is the temporality of this analysis. In this final step in the sequence, the focus
returns to the present time and place. Something powerful and
potentially hegemonic is happening, here and now, in the actions of the court itself vis-à-vis the defendant. Is it acceptable? Is it fair?
E. The Power of Sequences
As just shown, a choice-of-law analysis involves a sequence of steps, beginning with attention to individual concerns287 and moving to comparison of the affected states’
general domestic interests,288 followed by consideration of their
diplomatically negotiated interests,289 and, finally, a consideration of fundamental rights.290 At each step, the spatio-temporal horizon of the legal problem is different. The initial framing
of the issues focuses narrowly on the particular place and time
of the victim’s experience. With governmental interest analysis, the focus moves to the space and time of the nation-state
and its laws. Then, both of these unilateral perspectives are
obviated by a multilateral focus on the imaginary time of the
international system of states projected into the future. Finally, we return to a particularized, narrow focus on the spacetime of the present day encounter between the defendant and
court.
As one spatio-temporal horizon after another is
foregrounded, the set of actors also changes. A focus on the
particular dyad of the victim/perpetrator, in the guise of plaintiff and defendant, shifts to the clashing agencies of nationstates, which is replaced by attention to international society
between states, which, in turn, gives way to the encounter
between the individual and the state. This way of thinking
about agency and responsibility is not a zero-sum game. Instead, it treats agency as successive sets of positions in which
individual and state can displace one another. In short, conmentally unfair,” a state may apply its own law without violating the
Constitution).
287
Subpart V.A supra.
288
Subpart V.B supra.
289
Subpart V.C supra.
290
Subpart V.D supra.
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flict of laws does not so much resolve as sequence the colliding
spatio-temporal worlds at play in the Comfort Women issue.291
Although many practicing lawyers may have some intuitive
sense of the power of sequences, the concept of a sequence has
attracted little notice in academic legal thought. Legal scholars
routinely think about balancing tests, multi-factor analyses,
steps, and other structures of legal reasoning, but not sequences, even though we find instances of (simpler) sequences
in fields such as human rights law.292 Unlike these other legal
reasoning tools, a sequence is not a causal pathway, linking
one position to another, like a flowchart or a logic tree. Rather,
it is a temporal experience of taking on one framework, and
then trading it for another.
Were legal theorists to turn their mind to the power of
sequences, one inclination might be to treat them as a kind of
legal process. Sequences can help to legitimate the outcome of
a case by ensuring that all sides have been appropriately
heard. Socio-legal research shows that whatever the outcome,
parties are more willing to accept it if they believe that they
have been heard. This has led some scholars to conclude that
one function of proper legal process is to aid personal and
collective healing.293
As a supplement to any potential process legitimacy or
therapeutic function, however, the power of sequences emanates from the succession of self-contained worlds they present
and the after-effects of these worlds. As courts themselves
have recognized,294 a lawsuit can have important benefits even
for the losing party because the reasoning in the judgment can
291
On the need to move between levels, see PHILIPP SCHULZ & CATHERINE
O’ROURKE, LEGACY GENDER INTEGRATION GRP., DEVELOPING GENDER PRINCIPLES FOR
DEALING WITH THE LEGACY OF THE PAST 13–20 (2015).
292
See Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 84, 93–97 (Sujit Choudhry ed.,
2006) (analyzing the two-stage analysis that she presents as paradigmatic of postWorld War II rights-protecting documents).
293
Cf. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
38 CRIM. L. BULL. 244, 245–47 (2002) (describing restorative justice and therapeutic jurisprudence as similar in needing “to see the same case as many things at
once, with respect for the dignity of all actors involved” and in emphasizing the
consequences for restorative or therapeutic values, respectively, but different insofar as only restorative justice has a process ideal).
294
In overturning the trial judge’s dismissal at the jurisdictional stage of an
action to enforce a foreign judgment for massive environmental damage, a Canadian appeals court recently held, in effect, that the foreign plaintiff has a right to
lose. See Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corp., 2013 ONCA 758, ¶ 70 (Can. Ont.) (stating “[a]
party may bring an action for all kinds of strategic reasons, recognizing that their
chances of collection on the judgment are minimal. It is not the role of the court to
weed out cases on this basis . . .”). The Supreme Court of Canada subsequently
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structure wider social and political debates, closing some avenues for change and opening others.295
Thus, to return to the problem of historical injustice, a
sequenced style of reasoning, in which every possible spatiotemporal horizon is inhabited in turn, gives the parties and also
the court and its publics a structured, livable way of experiencing and acknowledging the multiple temporal realities that the
ruled that the case could proceed. Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje [2015] 3 S.C.R. 69
(Can.).
295
In our hypothetical, it is, of course, the case that a court might not work all
the way through the sequence because the plaintiff fails at one step. Or the
lawsuit might be otherwise barred. See supra note 22. With civil litigation for
wide-scale historical wrongs, however, even a time-barred suit may have an impact. Cf. MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN
AMERICA’S COURTS 53–54, 323 (2003) (showing, in the context of Holocaust restitution, how a “one-two punch”—U.S. class action lawsuits against Swiss banks
followed by the threat of sanctions against the banks by U.S. state and local
officials if they did not settle—overcame the limitations problem that had led
courts to dismiss earlier Holocaust cases as time-barred); id. at 218–21, 251
(discussing the rethinking of limitations law and choice of law in Holocaust cases
concerning stolen art); Mayo Moran, The Role of Reparative Justice in Responding
to the Legacy of Indian Residential Schools, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 529, 534–36 (2014)
(highlighting how decades-old claims of childhood sexual abuse in Indian Residential Schools that would otherwise be time-barred became possible when Canadian courts dramatically rethought limitations law and provincial legislatures
began to enact special limitation schemes).
Yukiko Koga’s account of the wartime compensation suits brought in Japan
by Chinese victims of forced labor is illuminating. Koga highlights the role of
fugen in these judgments:
Fugen, or supplement . . . . follows shubun (summary of the decision) and “facts and reasons” (the main argument of the ruling),
often as a paragraph or two at the end of the ruling. The function of
fugen is disputed among legal professionals. Some call it extralegal, a nonintegral part of the decision, and therefore not having
the same legal effect as the preceding text. Some call it the essence
of the conscience of the judges, which is expressed outside of the
constraints of law. In either case, both views share an understanding that fugen is something external to the actual ruling . . . .
In the fugen written for the forced labor case, the Supreme Court
judges’ deeply emotional and strong language emphasized the sufferings the plaintiffs endured not only during the war but also over
the ensuing years. They contrasted the plaintiffs’ psychological and
physical sufferings to the economic benefits that the defendant,
Nishimatsu Construction Corporation, enjoyed through its wartime
use of forced labor and through the inverted compensation it received from the Japanese government after the war ended. The
judges further reminded the defendant and the Japanese government that the Chinese plaintiffs’ lack of individual legal rights to
claim compensation did not prohibit the Nishimatsu Corporation
and the Japanese government from making their own voluntary
arrangements for redress, and strongly encouraged them to make
such efforts to provide compensation for the Chinese.
Koga, Between the Law, supra note 97, at 424. Koga elsewhere emphasizes
individual affective ties between Japanese lawyers and Chinese victims as a kind
of alternative. See Koga, Accounting for Silence, supra note 97, at 501–03.
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spatio-temporal diffusion of historical wrongs brings into play.
The sequence not only differs from the chaotic and traumatic
way that multiple temporalities crash into one another in ordinary life; it also goes beyond the efforts of feminist social theorists to imagine a polytemporal world because it addresses the
challenges of how to manage the dangers and excesses of
polytemporality—the “ghosts” of the past.
It is ultimately, then, in this humble conflict-of-laws technique that we find a possible technology for feminist futures.
The sequence, by definition, moves forward, if simply to the
next predetermined step in the sequence. It allows only for
some forms of closure in a particular moment, yet also for other
forms of openings and closings in other venues, contexts, and
moments. The sequence can thus become a way of working
through the personal and collective trauma of historical
injustice.
Yet, in our view, the power of a sequence is ultimately even
broader than an opportunity for an individual or a collective
healing experience. If legal theorists have neglected the sequence as a concept, anthropologists have analyzed its power
in great detail. A generation ago, Strathern,296 Roy Wagner,297
and other anthropologists298 described this kind of sequencing
in ritual action as the power of “obviation.” Marriage ceremony
is an example. Its ritual practices transform a daughter into a
wife: from being an intimate member of her native kin group, to
being separated from, but also standing for, her native kin
group as a whole in relation to the kin group of her spouse. The
transformation of a daughter into a wife is also the transformation of the participants’ collective world view—from a moment
of focus on internal relations to a moment of focus on relations
among kin groups as totalities.299 In this respect, ritual is
world-making. This dramatic transformation is an effect of ritual form. Ritual moments, or symbolic forms, unfold, one from
the other, in ways that are literally unthinkable in totality. The
power of the sequence inheres in the way in which each moment or trope is its own totality and is also transformed, in
turn, by the sequence itself.
Seen in this light, what is the broader power of the choiceof-law sequence that we described? A comparison with public
international law may help here. Lawyers are accustomed to
296
297
298
299

STRATHERN, supra note 156.
ROY WAGNER, SYMBOLS THAT STAND FOR THEMSELVES (1986).
JAMES F. WEINER, THE HEART OF THE PEARL SHELL (1988).
STRATHERN, supra note 156, at 229.
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thinking about the world-making capacities of public international law.300 The very point of public international law—its
treaties, its international organizations—is to transform the
world.301 In contrast, we often imagine that private international law takes the world as given (from public international
law) and merely fills in some of the gaps, by addressing the leftover individual experiences, traumas, or needs of private parties.302 In a sense, this is understandable: private international law is more unassuming and self-consciously workaday.
But analogizing to anthropologists’ studies of obviation, we
want to suggest that its choice-of-law sequence nonetheless
has powerful world-making capacities.
Rather than understanding private rights simply as
predefined wrongs in search of a transnational legal remedy,303
we need to recognize the transformative potential of the search.
We must engage this spatio-temporal diffusion as a modality of
world-making, rather than, for example, ignoring or dismissing
it as a byproduct of transnational legal processes,304 deploring
it as appropriation of the victims’ experience,305 or presenting it
as the global production of the local.306
The way in which the Comfort Woman statue has multiplied across jurisdictions, creating new “time knots” here and
300

See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERLEGAL ARGUMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (1989) (arguing that all
international legal argument is a composite of competing realist and idealist visions of international legal order).
301
See, e.g., MARK MAZOWER, GOVERNING THE WORLD: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA
(2012).
302
See Horatia Muir Watt, Private International Law Beyond the Schism, 2
TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 347 (2011) (describing this posture of private international law).
303
On transnational legal process theories of international law, see OONA A.
HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
190–204 (2005). Harold Koh, for example, “develop[s] the idea of transnational
legal process, in which legal interactions provoke a process of norm-internalization that involves both the international and domestic levels.” Id. at 191. Because
Koh’s interest tends to be why states obey global norms, for example, id. at
195–201, he does not explore ways in which the wrong itself can change character
through the process. For a close study of the role of conflict of laws in transnational legal process, see TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION, supra note 166.
304
Somewhat in this vein, Mikyoung Kim argues that memories are
“becom[ing] increasingly transnational and even global” and describes local differences in the framing of the Comfort Women issue in terms of tactics. Kim, Memorializing Comfort Women, supra note 26, at 90, 93.
305
Cf., e.g., MARIANNE HIRSCH, THE GENERATION OF POSTMEMORY: WRITING AND
VISUAL CULTURE AFTER THE HOLOCAUST (2012) (discussing whether we can “remember” other people’s memories).
306
See ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION 188–92 (1996).
NATIONAL
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there, already suggests that the consequences of the Comfort
Women issue extend beyond the victims’ personal experiences
to the very nature of the present and the future for all of us.
The choice-of-law sequence that we described gives order to
such spatio-temporal diffusion from one moment to the next.
Each moment has its own approach to the openness or closure
of the past and its relationship to the present and future. At
the same time, the interplay of closure and openness is mediated by conceptual techniques that move the sequence along
such that there can be partial resolutions and movement forward, even if these point to other kinds of linkages in other
domains such as politics or diplomacy. The sequence literally
becomes a tool for fashioning a future for the case at hand, and
hence also for the politics that animate it. Conflicts may turn
out to change the conversation, acknowledging, structuring,
and transforming the pieces of one claim into another claim.
The constraint of form in one meaning-less register may enable
the toleration of multiplicity in other meaning-full ones. While
the purpose of the sequence is not to change the world, in
practice it is transformative. The time and place of the state of
California are no longer the same once the analysis has incorporated these other horizons. The time and place of historical
injustice, too, are no longer the same.
As we stated at the outset, our main point is not to advocate for more actual conflicts cases. Rather, in the mode of an
interdisciplinary experiment, we offer the conflicts technique of
sequencing spatio-temporal horizons as a concrete contribution to theoretical inquiries about a feminist politics of the future. The feminist philosopher Elizabeth Grosz, for example,
argues for “a politics of surprise, a politics that cannot be
mapped out in advance, a politics linked to invention, directed
more at experimentation in ways of living than in policy and
step-by-step directed change, a politics invested more in its
processes than in its results.”307 The practical implication is
that feminist criticism and politics must be future oriented.
Grosz seeks
a concept of temporality not under the domination or privilege of the present, that is, a temporality directed to a future
that is unattainable and unknowable in the present, and
overwrites and redirects the present in an indeterminacy that

307

GROSZ, supra note 210, at 2.
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also inhabits and transforms our understanding of the privilege of the present.308

We have shown how a set of legal techniques, ironically, produces the kind of “politics of surprise” and direction toward the
future that Grosz is searching for.
Reflecting back on these feminist inquiries from the vantage point of conflict of laws, we would like to suggest that
perhaps what a feminist future demands is not so much a
“concept” of temporality (as Grosz and other theorists assume)
as a collectively enactable “form.” Like the mourning rituals
studied by anthropologists, our choice-of-law sequence offers a
simple way of working with political commitments, experiences, memories, and lifeworlds that are so incommensurable
as to be unthinkable in any singular totality. The form that we
have described, again like the mourning rituals, is not so much
a theory as it is a collective social practice. As such, it is collectively, rather than merely individually, transformative—worldmaking.
Given its global reach and its particular expertise in addressing space and time, conflict of laws is a particularly suggestive form for apprehending globally proliferating historical
injustice. However, we are not claiming that it is the only possible form for generating new feminist futures. On the contrary, we believe that such forms surround us, in ordinary
social life as in expert knowledge practices such as law. Thus,
we hope that our analysis might encourage those working in
other areas of law to examine the collective uses of form in time
in their own areas. Beyond the law, we hope that our juxtaposition of something as technical as conflict of laws with something as affective as the experience of hauntings by the past
and the rituals that people invoke to put an end to those hauntings may also spark interest in the workings of form in every
corner of life and to its potential as a source of feminist
transformation.
CONCLUSION
The agreement between Japan and Korea aims to foreclose
the problem of justice for the Comfort Women and, in this
respect, deserves the criticism it has attracted. One of the
lessons of twenty years of global activism leading to the recent
308
Id. at 1–2; see also Elizabeth Grosz, The Time of Thought, in FEMINIST TIME
AGAINST NATION TIME: GENDER, POLITICS, AND THE NATION-STATE IN AN AGE OF PERMANENT WAR, supra note 260, at 41 (theorizing feminist futures).
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agreement is that states can no longer hold onto issues as
theirs alone to resolve, to prosecute, to apologize for, or to
compensate.
Yet this loss of state control engenders its own dilemmas.
The reopening of the past as a legal issue in search of a forum
anywhere in the world casts the victims, the perpetrators, the
states, the activists, and all of us into a topsy-turvy world
where each new episode in each new locale sets more in motion
than it purports to resolve. For a San Francisco politician who
proposed a Comfort Women memorial for his city, or a Sydney
minister who offered his church grounds as a home for a replica of the Seoul statue, the issue may in fact have little or
nothing to do with Japan. Conversely, Korean-American feminists in the United States may identify more strongly with the
Comfort Women issue than some feminists in Korea, for whom
the appropriation of the Comfort Women issue by nationalists
is a pressing concern.
Conflict of laws takes for granted this kind of postmodern
world as its starting point. From this point of view, the crucial
question becomes not whether or what closure of the Comfort
Women issue is possible, but when and where reopening and
reclosing will occur. Our first contribution from conflicts has
been to redeploy the field’s know-how on a different moral and
political terrain—the problem of living in the subaltern present.
Seen through a feminist conflict-of-laws lens, Comfort Women
Trouble appears as an effect of what we have termed the spatiotemporal diffusion of historical injustice.
Moving beyond diagnostics, we have also shown how conflict of laws provides fresh techniques for managing, and living
with, spatio-temporal diffusion. By redescribing the field’s
techniques for dealing with time across space, we have shown
how they resonate with and also take us further than recent
debates about temporality in feminist social theory. In particular, our second contribution from conflicts has been to suggest
the potential of the technique that we identify as the sequencing of spatio-temporal horizons. Sequencing involves inhabiting different points of openness and closure in turn. Building
on the anthropology of ritual, we emphasize how such sequences have a “world-making” capacity—how they transform
the very space-times they act upon. This, we argue, is a more
specified and more powerful vision of a hopeful feminist future
that feminist social theorists are searching for.
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